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Abstract 
Virtualization is one of the most widely used technologies in modern day 
information technology datacentres. Companies like VMware, Citrix, Microsoft and 
Red Hat have invested a lot of money and expertise into making virtualization 
available to small and medium sized organizations with budget constraints. The 
technology is now very easy and physically flexible to deploy. Virtualization is so 
flexible that even traditional physical DMZs (demilitarized zones) can now be 
virtualized. Three different ways of deploying virtual DMZs are investigated in this 
research and the level of security provided by virtualized DMZs was compared to the 
level of security of traditional physical DMZs. 
Using VMware ESXi 4.1 as the hypervisor, a test bed was set up to determine which 
DMZ design was the most secure, whereas the DMZs represented a typical network 
of an organization. The test bed comprised domain controllers, an email server, DNS 
server, DHCP server, database server, application server and a web server, running 
as virtual machines within VMware ESXi 4.1; and these servers were split across a 
production and a DMZ environment. A quantitative research methodology approach 
was used to collect data with the help of vulnerability assessment tools to determine 
which virtual DMZ design was practical in regards to security in information 
technology.  
The results of the experiment indicate that each virtual DMZ design had an almost 
equal level of security and vulnerability. However, it was found that two virtual 
DMZ designs (design 2 and design 3), that leveraged less physical hardware resources 
were more secure than the traditional physical DMZ (deign 4). Level of security 
provided by the third virtual DMZ (design 1) was equally secure as the traditional 
physical DMZ. Further, an assessment of the above lead to the conclusion that 
various security elements; like firewalls and the inspection algorithms in the firewall, 
determine the level of security of a virtual DMZ. However, the requirement that 
virtual DMZs are more secure only where the configuration of these are considered 
to be made appropriately as in the physical set up of DMZs   
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1 Introduction 
Virtualization as a technology has existed for almost three decades now 
(Golden, 2008) and is the fastest growing technology in computing today. By 
emulating physical resources, virtualization enables IT (Information Technology) 
professionals to utilize the full capacity of their hardware resources. 
In the 1960s computer systems were expensive and only a handful of organizations 
invested in acquiring them for business purposes. These computer systems were 
mainframe architectures with the ability to handle multiple tasks simultaneously, but 
the resources of these systems were never used to their full potential. At that time 
IBM engineers developed virtualization on mainframe computers, so that its 
resources could be fully utilized for distributed computing (Reeder, 2010). IBM’s 
OS/360 with its distinct feature to address virtual memory space segmentation using 
a technique called “multiple address space” was capable of delivering private virtual 
machines to the users (Goldberg, 1974).  
In 1965, Gordon Moore stated the ever-increasing performance capacity of the 
silicon chips, which came to be known as Moore’s Law, in his paper “Cramming 
more components onto integrated circuits”. According to Moore (1965), “the 
complexity for minimum component costs has increased at a rate of roughly a factor 
of two per year. Certainly over the short term this rate can be expected to continue, if 
not to increase.” In simple words, it means that every year the performance of silicon 
chips will double compared to the previous generation. This trend is still relevant, but 
with the performance increasing twice every two years, rather than every year 
(Golden, 2008).  
With the increased performance of silicon chips over the years, they are capable of 
handling multiple processes at a given point of time. Today x86 and x64 silicon 
processors are the most popular processors in computing. These processors are not as 
expensive as their predecessors were in the 60s. They are usually found in data centre 
servers and even used in desktop computers. Most of the time the processing power 
of these silicon chips is utilized at only 10 -15%, which is a waste of the processor’s 
ability to perform multitasking, meaning the hardware is always left underutilized.  
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In 1999, today’s biggest market stakeholder of virtualization technology is VMware. 
It first released “VMware Workstation” which was capable of deploying virtual 
machines on Windows or Linux-based operating systems. Following the success of 
VMware Workstation, the company launched the ESX server as a bare metal 
hypervisor (VMware, 2009). VMware changed the way our data centres are 
resourced. VMware products also allowed IT professionals to deploy multiple virtual 
operating systems on a single physical machine. This enabled them to exploit the 
hardware capacity of the machine to its fullest. Where a single physical server was 
required to cater services to the users, with the help of VMware and other 
virtualization vendors like Microsoft and Citrix, a single physical server is now used 
to host multiple virtual servers, providing various services to its users.  
In addition, there were other intangible benefits of virtualization, besides utilizing 
hardware resources to its fullest: the cost of power bills and infrastructure was cut 
and better server clustering and consolidation of server services were possible. A 
report issued at the first global CCIE (Cisco Certified Internetwork Expert) survey claims 
that  virtualization will top the investments in networking over the next five years as 
it saves energy, cost, and increases the operational efficiency with simplified 
management of computer networks (Cisco, 2010). 
Virtualization has come a long way from the old IBM OS/360 mainframe computers 
to new x86 architecture computers and has gained tremendous popularity with 
information technology professionals. There are many reasons for this technology to 
be so popular within the IT community today. In the next section, I will explain why 
the IT world has adopted virtualization so quickly in the past decade and why it is an 
indispensable tool for data centres today.  
1.1 Why get virtualized? 
IT professionals all over the world have shown a great interest in virtualization and 
technology solutions associated with it. Besides cutting down power bills, there is 
more than one reason for companies to invest in virtualization and its associated 
technologies. According to a white paper survey outlining the benefits of 
virtualization, published by VMware in 2009, virtualization helps reduce IT 
operational cost. This technology also reduces the time spent on routine 
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administrative tasks as well as backups, data protection, application availability. 
Thus, virtualization enables businesses to deliver services more quickly (VMware, 
2009).  
Other benefits of virtualization are its ability to centralize server management and 
consolidation to its fullest, increase storage on the fly without stopping server 
services, consolidated backup, high availability of redundant server environments, 
with features like live migration and disaster recovery. Apart from the technical 
benefits that virtualization brings to the IT department and the business; it also 
contributes to establishing environmentally friendly data centres (Forrester, 2009). 
Virtualization is also becoming a key technology in cloud computing, which is 
considered by many IT professionals to be the way computing will be done in future 
(Trend Micro, 2010).  
Having acknowledged the benefits of virtualization, it also brings a whole lot of new 
complexities to the traditional OSI architecture and introduces a set of new concepts 
and terminologies related to virtualization in the OSI model. The next section in the 
chapter discusses various concepts introduced into our computer networks and 
terminologies created by virtualization. 
1.2 Concepts and Terminologies in Virtualization 
The introduction of virtualization has been one of the most exciting things that have 
happened in computer networking since the advent of internet and the World Wide 
Web. Virtualization has introduced many new concepts and terminologies, like 
“guest and host operating system”, “hypervisor” and “bare metal”, just to name the 
most prominent ones. Since virtualization itself is a concept, this report will first 
discuss what virtualization is and will then proceed to other underlying concepts and 
terminologies. 
1.2.1 What is Virtualization? 
Virtualization of hardware in computer systems is a technique used to separate and 
make physical resources of hardware available to logical machines also referred to as 
“virtual machines” (Li & Mohammed, 2008). Virtual machines provide services to 
their users the same way a physical machine does. For example:  The job of a file 
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server is to provide file sharing capabilities to its users; it does not matter if the 
server is deployed as a physical machine or a virtual machine. The file server will 
still provide the file sharing services as long as it has connectivity to the network and 
its users. 
1.2.2 Terminologies 
Hypervisor 
The hypervisor is a piece of software written to separate and make the resources of 
the physical machine available to the logical machine. Traditionally, hypervisors 
were referred to as “Virtual Machine Monitors” or VMM (Cleeff, Pieters & 
Wieringa, 2009). Typically, there are two types of hypervisors (seeFigure1.1): bare-
metal hypervisors and hosted ones. Bare metal hypervisors are installed directly on 
the physical hardware, just like any other operating system, e.g. - VMware ESXi, 
Xen Server, Hyper-V. A hosted hypervisor is installed within an operating system. It 
is installed just like any other application, e.g. – VMware Workstation, Microsoft 
Virtual PC, Xen Desktop. 
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Figure1.1. Logical architecture of bare-metal and hosted hypervisor  
Host Machine or Host Operating System 
The physical machine on which the hypervisor is installed to execute the separation 
of physical resources and host multiple virtual machines is referred to as a “host 
machine”.  
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Guest machine or Guest Operating System 
The logical machine created with the help of the hypervisor to access the same 
physical resources without interrupting any other logical separations and 
representation of the host machine is referred to as a “guest machine”. In the 
discussion about virtualization, it may also be referred to as virtual machine (VM). 
Virtualization has become such an intricate technology that even vendor specific 
philosophies have emerged in terms of deploying virtualized environment with their 
solutions. The two most commonly practiced virtualization philosophies today are 
full virtualization, which is supported by VMware, and para-virtualization, supported 
by Citrix and Microsoft. A reflection on the two philosophies is presented in the 
following sections. 
Full Virtualization 
In a fully virtualized environment, the virtual machine monitor or the hypervisor 
presents all the physical services of the host machine to the virtual machine, 
including the BIOS of the host machine. The virtual machine is abstracted 
completely from the host machine and sits in a decoupled isolated zone. Full 
Virtualization is considered to be the most secure form of virtualization, since the 
device drivers are installed within the hypervisor. The virtual machine does not 
communicate to the physical resources directly; it communicates via hypervisor 
(VMware, 2007). 
Para-virtualization 
A virtual machine created with a para-virtualized hypervisor uses the techniques of 
resource sharing, where the kernel is modified to represent the required device of the 
physical machine to the VM. The hypervisor in para-virtualization operates within 
the operating system that is modified to work in a virtual machine. The device 
drivers in para-virtualization are installed parallel to the hypervisor, so the virtual 
machine can directly talk to the physical resources, implementing resource sharing 
(VMware, 2007).  
Apart from those two different virtualization concepts, there exist three different 
types of virtualization, in terms of its implementation in computer networks, itself. In 
the next section the three different types of virtualization will be discussed.  
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Demilitarized Zone DMZ 
In computing Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is a logical network that hosts an 
organizations public facing services. Usually it hosts services like web server, ftp 
server, mail server, DNS server or any other application server that external users 
need access to from the internet. It resides between the inside (secure) network (Local 
area network) and the outside (insecure) network that is commonly referred as the 
internet (Cisco, 2009). 
1.3 Types of virtualization 
Computer networks are made up of different devices that provide services to other 
devices on the same network. These devices are routers, switches, hubs, servers, 
desktop machines and storage arrays, just to name a few. There are three ways 
virtualization can be implemented: client, server and storage virtualization. 
The most popular ones used to depict different types of virtualization will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
1.3.1 Desktop Virtualization 
Desktop virtualization, sometimes referred to as “client virtualization”, is the 
capability of the virtualization residing on the client or desktop. Desktop 
virtualization is like a client-server model, where the virtual machine is residing on a 
data centre server. The virtual machine is presented to the user anywhere with the 
help of a virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) client (Golden, 2008).  
1.3.2 Server Virtualization 
As previously discussed, virtualization has changed our data centre dramatically and 
most of the virtualization action in our data centres has occurred in servers (Golden, 
2008). Server virtualization looks at providing multiple virtual servers within a single 
physical server.   
1.3.3 Storage Virtualization 
In storage virtualization, separate physical storage devices are combined to form a 
consolidated storage pool that is presented to the servers as a single physical storage 
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device. Storage virtualization has three approaches associated with it: DAS - ‘direct 
attached storage’, NAS - ‘network area storage’ and SAN - ‘storage area network’ 
(Golden, 2008) 
This research is primarily focussing on server virtualization in virtual DMZs. Before 
proceeding to the research topic, let us look at server virtualization with VMware’s 
ESXi being the technology of choice for this research. 
1.4 Server Virtualization using VMware’s ESXi 
Since the launch of the first VMware product in 1999, it has been the most dominant 
and stable virtualization technology (VMware, 2009). VMware alone holds 50% of 
the market share in virtualization, whereas other vendors combine to form the 
remaining 50% (VMware, 2009). A research survey done by F5 networks in the time 
from September to December 2008 reported that VMware’s ESX is the most widely 
deployed server virtualization product (F5 Networks, 2009). At the time of 
commencement of this research, VMware’s ESXi 4.0 was the state-of-the-art 
hypervisor for server virtualisation. There have been speculations amongst IT 
professional that VMware will stop shipping and supporting ESX and will only 
support ESXi in future, which is a free hypervisor (VMblog.com, 2012) 
Besides being the most dominant player in the virtualization market, VMware’s 
ESXi specification and features make it a reliable and the favourite choice of IT 
professionals. Some of the features of ESXi are listed below. 
 Small foot print –ESXi requires 70 MB of disk space for installation, as 
compared to a minimum of 2 GB with Hyper-V and 1.8 GB with XenServer 
5.6 
 Hardened Drivers – hardware drivers for virtual machines are optimized by 
hardware vendors  
 Advanced memory management - Ability to reclaim unused memory, 
duplicate memory pages and compressed memory pages 
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 Advanced storage management – provides independent storage management, 
with storage allocation on the fly without interrupting any other virtual 
machine or host machine 
 Host resource management - Network traffic shaping, per-VM resource 
shares, allows the setting of quality of service priorities for storage and 
network I/O 
 Flexible Resource Allocation – add virtual CPU, memory and virtual hard 
disk on the fly, extend hard disk space  (VMware, 2010) 
With such advanced features and specifications and being a free enterprise class 
virtualization Hypervisor, VMware’s ESXi is considered to be an ideal choice to 
conduct this research. The next section in this chapter discusses the research topic 
and why it has become the key research area for the author. 
1.5 Research Question – Interest and Motivation 
The aim of this study was to determine which virtual DMZ design, is the most secure 
to implement while still retaining the information security of the network (similar to 
physical network infrastructure). This was tested by using VMware’s ESXi, briefly 
explained in 1.4.What security features should be considered while implementing 
virtualization was also investigated.  
So, “Is it secure to implement DMZ in a virtual network infrastructure?” is the 
primary research question that the author seeks to answer by carrying out this 
research. Other secondary questions to be considered to facilitate the primary 
research question were the following: 
 How can virtualized DMZs be implemented?  
 Which is the most secure type of virtual DMZ? 
 Which DMZ design is appropriate for a specific business requirement? 
 What impact will virtual DMZs have on information security in contrast to 
traditional DMZs? 
 What is to be avoided while deploying VMs in a DMZ? 
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The research topic was of personal interest to the author, because virtualization is 
easy to deploy but people tend to overlook the security issues that can arise with its 
implementation. Due to the fact that virtualization tremendously reduces the cost of 
IT operations, and is a green technology as well, IT professionals could misjudge 
which network infrastructure services should be virtualized and which should not be 
virtualized.  
“DMZ Virtualization with VMware infrastructure”, a paper published by VMware in 
2008 indicates that the technology is accessible and is able to deploy traditional 
DMZs in a completely virtualized environment. The paper suggests three deployment 
strategies and firewall implementations, to establish virtual DMZs. Understanding 
which deployment strategy is best suited is essential for IT professionals utilizing 
virtualization. Besides exploring which deployment strategy is most suitable, this 
thesis also investigates which mitigation strategy will most effectively address the 
security issues in virtual DMZ deployments. 
As it is believed that cloud computing will be an integral part of computing in future, 
the investigation of how secure our cloud is, is also a topic that motivates and 
personally interests the author to carry out this research and explore whether 
virtualization is really secure for cloud computing, A thing to consider at this stage is 
the popularity of cloud computing. The benefits of cloud computing, private or 
public and what it can bring to the computing and information technology 
community are usually exaggerated. Moreover, virtualization is one of the 
underlying technologies that formulate our cloud’s data centres (Armbrust et al, 
2010). For the growth of this technology our cloud needs to know how secure 
virtualization is. 
In order to answer the questions mentioned above and build a theory comprising 
various point of views, vulnerability assessment is conducted in a virtualized 
environment. Results of vulnerability assessment will justify the stability of the 
environment and would suggest what security policies are to be employed by IT 
professionals to   secure virtual infrastructure with DMZs and be a part of both the 
private and public cloud.  
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Before commencing research for this thesis, a literature review was conducted, which 
is dealt with in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The aim of this review was to explore 
previous research on this topic and to gather information on security issues related to 
DMZs and non-DMZ networks. 
1.6 Summary 
The aim of the introductory chapter was to build a basic conceptual background and 
express the thoughts for the research topic that would be later carried out throughout 
the research. The first thing discussed was the history of virtualization as technology 
and its evolution to know how it has grown today in our x86 computer architecture. 
A brief explanation about the various types of virtualization technologies and two 
different types of virtualization architectures has been covered in various sections of 
this chapter. The vendor specific virtualization approach is also mentioned with 
reference to VMware ESXi. The concepts and terminologies that are used in the 
virtualization are explained quite thoroughly, with a view to prepare the readers for 
having a better understating of the forthcoming chapters. Finally, an expression of 
the author’s interest for the research topic is followed by the structure of the thesis to 
conclude chapter one of the thesis.   
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2 Literature Review 
Virtualization has been adopted rapidly during the past few years. It has fascinated 
the computing world with its many features and has demonstrated many ways it can 
change our traditional data centres.  Thus, virtualization has become a very popular 
topic for research. Many studies have been conducted in the past decade that 
addresses questions concerning virtualization. Virtualization technology vendors and 
their business partners constantly publish papers to promote virtualization as a 
technology.  
It is very important to be informed of current advancements and existing publications 
that address virtualization and related information security issues. A literature review 
was carried out to confirm the uniqueness of this thesis and its aim. As part of the 
literature review, journal articles, conference papers, research thesis and various 
papers were reviewed. This has confirmed the author’s point of view that 
virtualization issues pertaining to DMZ design security is a topic scarcely studied by 
the IT community. Literature for this thesis was reviewed from two different angles. 
Publications were reviewed from a network and a systems engineer’s perspective on 
the one hand and reviewed from a computer programmer’s perspective on the other 
hand.  
The next section discusses the results of the literature review carried out. The results 
are discussed from both perspectives mentioned above and followed by a literature 
map at the end of the discussion.  
2.1 Network and System Engineers take on Secure Virtualization 
With the introduction of virtualization, network and system engineers have found 
ways to securely deploy and maintain their networks. Implementing virtualization is 
easy, but it introduces many complexities to the design of the network. Deployment 
of virtual machines and hosts, maintaining virtual server clusters, introducing 
administrative privileges for virtual machines and hosts, introducing administrative 
privileges for virtual networking, maintaining security policies surrounding virtual 
infrastructure, monitoring inter-VM traffic and the transit from virtual to physical 
networks are only some of the design complexities that arise. 
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These complexities, if not addressed properly can easily lead to security loop holes in 
the design of the entire network. Virtualization security issues and mitigation 
strategies from the systems and networks security perspective are discussed in the 
following section. 
2.1.1 Security Issues 
Virtualization introduces a new layer of implementation to our traditional computer 
networks (Bliekertz, 2010). Considering the implementation of this new layer 
virtualization introduces new security issues in the network. A literature review 
focusing on security issues concerning virtualization is thoroughly discussed below. 
One of the benefits of virtualization is its ability to easily scale up server 
environments. Although a benefit, it is also a great concern for security 
administrators.  The scalability factor in large network deployments can lead to 
inconsistency in monitoring the server environment (Hietala, 2009).  With a few 
mouse clicks virtual machines appear and disappear from the virtual infrastructure 
very quickly. VMM (Virtual Machine Monitors) gives administrators the flexibility for 
deploying new virtual machines in their server environment and they are no longer 
bound to acquiring physical resources. Over a period of time this has an impact on 
the security mechanisms within the network, as the work load on administrators also 
increases and may lead to inconsistency in security mechanisms as well (Bliekertz, 
2010). 
Virtual Machines can be easily migrated from one physical machine/host to another. 
By default virtual machine monitors assign dynamic MAC address to the virtual 
machines and when these virtual machines are migrated to another host they are 
assigned a new MAC address. This makes it difficult to physically identify a virtual 
machine, as compared to the traditional network, where a physical machine is 
associated with a constant physical MAC address on the network. According to 
Oberheide, Cooke and Jahanain, (2008), when virtual machine migration is initiated, 
the virtual machine configuration and data files are transferred between two different 
hosts. The file transfer is not encrypted and virtual machine data can be 
compromised by attacks like man- in- the-middle.  
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VMM enables system administrators to take snapshots of their virtual machines at a 
given time. In case changes are made to the services running in the virtual machine 
and start causing unpredictable behaviour, the administrator can always reset the 
machine to the state when the snapshot was taken (Gabhardt & Tomlinson, 2008). 
The problem here is that if the snapshots are not up to date and were taken before the 
release of important security patches, the reset process can expose the virtual 
machine to known vulnerabilities. If these are not patched, this can become an 
“attacking playground” on the network (Yu, Weng, Li & Luo, 2010). Another related 
issue is that system administrators keep templates of their operating systems in the 
VMM and when a new virtual machine is required they simply copy the desired 
template and deploy new virtual machines (Owens, 2009). These templates again 
raise the question of security patching in the operating system (VMware, 2007). 
In a traditional network the physical machines are connected to the network via a 
particular port on the switch that can be monitored. In a virtual environment this is 
not the case; large virtual machine deployment can be attached to one physical port 
on the network. These virtual machines, if communicating with each other, do not 
need to pass traffic onto the physical port; they can communicate with each other, as 
they are part of one single virtual switch. In other words, inter-VM traffic is opaque 
to the physical network, because they lie within the hypervisor layer (Sparks & 
James, 2008). Monitoring inter-VM traffic is a security challenge within any network 
(Young, MacDonald & Pescatore, 2007), as our traditional IDS/IPS do not 
adequately address this issue. 
Furthermore, virtual machines can easily bypass IP filtering on firewalls (Apani, 
2009). When a VM migrates from one host to another it might change its security 
zone if the physical NIC of the host to which the VM should be migrated is placed 
outside the firewall security zone (Xianqin, Han, Sumei & Xiang, 2009). Thus, the IP 
filtering rules no longer apply to the migrated virtual machine and can lead to serious 
security concerns. With virtual environments being so volatile it is difficult for 
security administrators to enforce security policies with existing network firewalls 
(Young, MacDonald & Pescatore, 2007). 
Administration of virtual infrastructure is yet another important security issue (Pfaff 
et al, 2009). Virtualization emulates layer 1, layer 2 and layer 3 of the OSI model, 
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which ultimately hosts other layers of this model. De facto layers 1 to 3 are managed 
by the network engineers and remaining layers are managed by systems engineers. 
VMMs/hypervisors are managed by systems engineers, as VMMs are software to 
emulate virtual environments. However, these VMMs also emulate advanced 
networking features like creation of VLANs, link aggregation and IEEE 802.1q 
trunks (Cassadoet al., 2006). Thus system engineers hold privileges over networking 
features and network engineers can easily shut down any system in the virtual 
environment. Changes made by system engineers in the overlapping networking 
zone, which is actually not their area of expertise, can cause potential downtime in 
the entire network.  
This leads to design problems in virtual environments and adds to the complexity of 
the network. Virtual infrastructures can be designed in numerous ways. When virtual 
environments are not designed carefully, detectable loop holes can be left in the 
entire network. Cleeff, Pietersand & Wieringa (2009) in their paper “Security 
implications Of Virtualization: A literature Study” mention that there is a limit to 
knowing what physical network resources should be, and what should not be 
virtualized. It is very easy to deploy IDSs and IPSs on virtual servers, but the 
question to be asked here is if it is necessary to do so. In 2008, VMware published 
the paper “DMZ virtualization with VMware Infrastructure”. The authors of the 
paper suggested that virtualization can design our traditional DMZ in three different 
ways (VMware, 2008). Two proposed designs in the paper used physical firewalls to 
control the DMZ traffic, but the third design named “Fully Collapsed DMZ” was 
very interesting, as it suggested implementing virtual firewalls and different security 
zones within a single physical host machine (Armknecht, 2009). This design is also 
considered to be the most complex design in terms of implementation and 
management. Consolidating all physical DMZ resources into virtual ones, introduces 
the risk of managing security trust zones, as VMs are flexible in their placement, 
with features like live migration and high availability. MacDonald and Young (2007) 
stated that it is possible to collapse all the physical servers into virtual servers, but 
not necessary in their research paper “Server Virtualization can Break DMZ 
Security”. 
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Another design-related issue is the allocation of resources to the virtual machine 
(Reuben, 2007). VMM allocates VM resources like CPU, memory and NIC. These 
virtual hardware resources are shared with other VMs from the host’s physical 
resources. In a client server environment a resource-consuming VM, if configured to 
increase resources dynamically, can lead to an internal denial or service attacks, as it 
will start consuming resources from other VMs. A more detailed description of this 
security issue is given in Section 2.2.1. Such configuration practices in high 
availability client-server networks with high data traffic can lead to network 
downtime.  
Neither system nor network engineers can ignore the above mentioned security 
issues that arise with virtualization. The next section discusses these issues in more 
detail. 
2.1.2 Mitigation strategies 
Researchers and virtualization solution vendors have always tried to reveal security 
issues in virtualization and have suggested solutions to mitigate these issues. The 
following paragraph outlines some mitigation strategies and suggestions that could 
help network and system engineers tackle most security issues mentioned in 
Section 2.1.1.  
Most design and architecture-related security problems in virtual environments can 
be fixed with the implementation of correct security policies (Hietala, 2009). IT 
operation departments can ensure that correct configuration and security mechanisms 
are designed to address virtual infrastructures individually and also collectively with 
the existing physical infrastructure. The separation of administrative duties should 
also be maintained (McAfee, 2007). Network and systems engineers should be 
responsible for their work domains in virtual infrastructure (Apani, 2009). At times, 
when work processes are overlapping, IT staff should collaborate, rather than just 
experimenting with different combinations of deployment methods.  
In traditional networks, firewalls, IDSs and IPSs have always been used as a tool to 
secure data traffic. Virtual environments also demand such tools. A number of IT 
equipment distributors have designed software-based appliances that can be 
integrated into the hypervisor like an API application (Young, MacDonald & 
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Pescatore, 2007). These appliances provide firewall, IDS and IPS features that are 
smart enough to understand the underlying virtualization layer, unlike traditional 
firewalls. In a paper published in 2009 by TrendMicro, it is suggested that these 
appliances can still maintain the integrity of security zones even after the VM is 
migrated from one host to another. This appliance is called a “coordinated VM 
watchdog”, as it monitors the VM behaviour in the hypervisor and also counters 
attacks, since it is a combination of IDS and IPS features. Moreover, this watchdog is 
capable of monitoring inter-VM traffic. (VMware, 2007) 
In 2007 VMware recommended the following security implications during 
administering virtual network infrastructure that can help mitigate a lot of security 
issues while designing virtual environments. The following list discusses these 
implications.   
 Not to install insecure services like FTP and telnet  
 Set firewall policies to block all incoming port traffic to the service console  
 Tagging VLAN using industry standard IEEE 802.1q for traffic within the 
virtual switch for isolation  
 Implement a resource allocation limit to prevent VM from using resources of 
other VMs 
 Use of SSL with 256 bit AES for block encryption and 1024 bit RSA key 
encryption for web interface clients 
 LUN (Logical Unit Numbering in SAN) masking virtual storage  
In addition, MacDonald & Young (2007) stated that the highly privileged service 
console, with root access for the virtual environment, should be kept on a highly 
secure network and be separated by firewalls. This network should be in no direct 
communication with the intranet or DMZ traffic and should be separated completely 
from internet traffic using firewalls. In addition, access to the service console should 
be limited by the implementation of appropriate authentication techniques and SSH 
should be used to access the command line interface (Sparks & James, 2008).  
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OS security updates are released from time to time to address identified 
vulnerabilities after the release of the OS. OS or VM templates, and also VM 
snapshots, should be patched and updated before they are deployed (Gabhardt & 
Tomlinson, 2008). This drastically helps to counter attacks aimed at virtual 
infrastructures (Ramasamy & Schunter, 2007).  
When designing security zones in virtual infrastructure, MacDonald & Young (2007) 
suggested that each security zone should be completely separated from one another. 
A dedicated NIC hould be used to host one security zone on a physical machine. In 
situations where limited NICs are available, VLANs can be used to separate security 
zones with VLAN tagging. However, in my opinion a dedicated physical NIC is the 
best option. 
Jim D. Hietala suggested that network and systems engineers should implement these 
mitigation strategies, as they can immensely decrease the security risk on and within 
virtual infrastructures (Hietala, 2009). Security concerns introduced by virtualization 
will be discussed from a software engineer’s prospective in the next section. 
2.2 Computer Programmers take on Secure Virtualization 
From a software programmer’s point of view, networking or systems technologies 
involve thousands or even millions of line of code that are programmed to function 
as intended. For example, OSI model’s layer 2 devices are programmed to handle 
and recognize layer 2 protocols and in the same way layer 3 devices understand layer 
3 protocols. But now programmers have combined the functionality of layer 2 and 
layer 3 devices in one single device, known as “L2L3” or multilayer devices. 
Similarly, virtualization is a kernel-based software technology that emulates physical 
hardware and presents it to any OS software. In that way the OS looks at this 
emulated software-based hardware as it would look at a physical hardware. 
Researchers have been studying this emulation process and are constantly 
scrutinising the coding practices to improve virtualization. The following section 
discusses the security issues and possible solutions to address these issues.  
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2.2.1 Security Issues 
Software engineers face many challenges when it comes to designing virtualization 
solutions that operate securely. Problems within the system constantly challenge the 
security of virtualization technologies; software engineers call the insecurities within 
the system “vulnerabilities of virtualization software”. Hackers could exploit these 
vulnerabilities and gain control or tamper with the virtual environment (Voorsluys, 
2009). The following paragraph discusses security issues that arise as a result of 
vulnerabilities in virtualization software.  
VMM resource allocation is a potential security risk that can lead to self-denial of 
service attacks within the virtual network infrastructure. Although this has been 
mentioned earlier in Section 2.1.1, let us discuss this issue in more detail. We know 
that VMM or in more generic terms the “hypervisor” allocates resources to VMs in 
its controlled environment (Ports & Garfinkel, 2008). Now, since it allocated 
resources, it is the single point of interaction between the physical layer and the 
virtual layer. VMM assigns each VM to a memory block on the physical memory 
and a processing space on the CPU for I/O operations (Wangetal.2010). The VM is 
constrained to its allocated isolation. Besides assigning resources to the VMs, the 
VMM is also responsible for not allowing its VMs to randomly demand more 
resources when the VM is running short of its allocated resources. When the VM 
starts using resources outside its allocated resources, it deprives other VMs of their 
resources in the virtual infrastructure and causes performance issues, and in some 
cases denial of service (Reuben, 2007).  
Following the theory explained above, Ormanday (2007), conducted a similar 
research and developed a tool for stress testing and random I/O port generation. 
Ormanday also investigated coding flaws related to the resource management of 
hypervisors. He successfully managed to exploit the vulnerabilities in the hypervisor 
code and tamper the virtual environment for his experimental purposes.  
Another important security issue troubling the world of virtualization is the secure 
monitoring of the hypervisor while it is executing operations to manage the physical 
and virtual resources (Payneet al, 2008). VMM maintains the entire flow between 
physical and virtual worlds (Payne, Carbone & Lee, 2007).  If VMM is 
compromised, it can eventually control the entire virtual network.  
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The virtualization technology addresses highly redundant environments that help 
network and systems engineers to design virtual infrastructure with minimum 
downtime. Live migration technologies within VMMs empower redundancy in 
virtual infrastructure (Voorsluys, 2009). It is one of the most important features of 
virtualization technology, but studies have shown that it is not secure. In their 
research published in 2008, Oberheide discuss how live-migration features can be 
used to exploit the virtual environment. Virtual machines are stored as files and 
during migration; these files are transferred from one host to another. Some 
encryption techniques protect the live migration of VM files that contain VM settings 
and sensitive data. During their research, Oberheide and his colleges successfully 
managed to alter the VM during live migration. They discussed three threat models 
in virtualization live migration, featured in both, the XEN and the VMware platform. 
The Control Plane Threat Model exposes authentication during migration, the Data 
Plane Threat Model exposes snooping and tampering with OS data and finally the 
migration Module Model exposes VMM vulnerabilities during migration to control 
the virtualized environment. Moreover, Oberheide et al. developed an exploitation 
tool called “Xensploit” that is designed to perform a man-in-the-middle-attack to 
alter data during live migration. 
Another issue affecting systems and network engineers is the incapability of virtual 
environments to diversify their tasks (Pfaff et al, 2009). Secure Layer 2 and Layer 3 
technologies, like VPN tunnels that provide end–to-end secure solutions have still 
not been developed in VMM. Typically, networks have ACLs to restrict network 
nodes from accessing different network areas. With live migration VMs bypassing 
ACLs, network security policies are jeopardized. Currently there is minimal 
development in virtual switch technology within hypervisors that are capable of 
tackling this issue. 
However, the ability to isolate one VM from another is one of the main reasons why 
virtualization became so popular. In a typical virtual environment a VM machines 
does not know anything about other virtual machines on the same physical host. In 
VMware Workstation VM isolation was compromised (Nance, Hay & Bishop, 
2008). This break was called “VM Escape”.  This was a desktop virtualization 
vulnerability that has been addressed by VMware, but no VM Escape attempts have 
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been recorded in server virtualisation products. Having discussed that, VM Escape is 
still achievable and we still need to further develop solutions to address this issue in 
server virtualization, if it occurs.  
Virtualization technology providers and their partners have investigated these 
software issues. As it is important for IT professionals to solve the problems 
mentioned above, I will go on discussing various attempts to solve these problems in 
the next section. 
2.2.2 Mitigation strategies 
Mitigating security issues in any technology is an on-going process and it practically 
never stops. Virtualization as a technology is no exception. Therefore, researchers 
are currently investigating various mitigation strategies, some of which I will briefly 
discuss in the following section. 
In 2008, Nance, Hay and Bishop, mentioned introspection techniques to mitigate 
security issues in virtual network infrastructures in their paper “Virtual Machine 
Introspection Observation or Interference”. This technique was first presented in 
2003.This was explained in detail in the article “Virtual Machine Introspection 
Based Architecture for Intrusion Detection”, a research paper written by Garfinkel 
and Rosenblum (2008). In this approach VMM is placed at a lower level than the 
VM and has the ability to investigate the VM. According to Cleef, Pieters and 
Wieringa (2009) this process is termed “introspection”. Introspection tools enable us 
to see the on-going processes within the VM without interfering or entering the VM. 
Granfinkel and Rosenblum (2008) suggested that these introspection tools should be 
used to monitor the communication activities of the VM. They suggested that 
introspection tools can be integrated within the VMM kernel to detect intrusions and 
these tools also exhibit antivirus capabilities. Introspection tools can also be used to 
perform security policy checks in virtual network infrastructures from the hypervisor 
level. Similar attempts were made by Riley, Jiang and Xu (2008) focussing on 
detecting the root kit of the hypervisors.  
Another research conducted by Garfinkeland & Rosenblum (2005) suggested that 
virtualization security issues can be addressed if security policies are designed to 
incorporate a virtualization layer. One way to do this is by integrating firewalls into 
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VMMs, so that out-of-band security policies can be applied to guest OS isolations. 
This would enhance centralized security management capabilities by addressing 
deployment flexibilities, OS diversities, VM mobility and VM’s identity integrity 
during VM migration from one host to another.    
As mentioned in section 2.2.1, it is easy to tamper with VM configuration files 
during the live migration of a VM to a different host. Recent developments in 
encryption techniques can help eliminate this security risk. According to Oberheide 
(2008) virtualization developers are trying to devise various solutions to secure the 
VM migration process. In a “Black Hat” conference held in 2008, Oberheide 
suggested that tampering with VM during migration can be prevented by encrypting 
the migration channel, as encryption techniques are quite secure. 
Bratuset al. (2008) studied how the field-programmable gate array (FPGA) technique 
can be used to secure virtualized environments. The authors proposed that traps and 
log events from virtualization emulation software can be debugged and analysed to 
tackle security issues arising from guest OSs. They found that FPGA is flexible and 
programmable and recommended that the code execution should occur between the 
CPU and the memory cache, therefore, making it faster to debug and analyse VMM 
logs for consistency. The FPGA is programmed to deny or allow VM access to 
underlying hardware parallel to the VMM kernel.  
A discussion in section 2.2.1 mentioned how resource allocation can cause self-
denial of service attack within the virtual environment. To mitigate self-denial of 
service attack the VMM should be capable of restricting the amount of resource 
allocated to the VM, and also it should not allow the VM to control VMM (VMware, 
2007). 
These mitigation strategies would definitely increase virtual infrastructure’s security. 
In addition to the above, there is still great room for development in mitigation 
techniques and strategies because when we move our virtual infrastructure to the 
cloud/internet, virtual environments are exposed to completely new bunch of security 
risks and vulnerabilities. The discussion of those vulnerabilities and security risks is 
outside the scope of this research and therefore would not be discussed in detail.    
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From the information gathered in the literature review, a literature map was created. 
The designed literature map is attached in the Appendix C. 
2.3 Summary 
A literature survey from various sources was carried out to highlight security issues 
with virtualization from the network engineer’s and software engineer’s point of 
view. The referred literature also helped in formulating a discussion to present the 
mitigation strategies that network and software engineers can implement to secure 
virtual environments. From the discussion held in this chapter a literature map was 
designed at the end of the chapter. Further, to conduct research, the author determined 
the appropriate research methodology. A detailed description of the research 
methodology is covered in the next chapter.  
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3 Research Methodology 
Whenever research of any kind is done, the results have to be justified and supported 
by relevant data. Researchers adopt two major broad categories of research 
methodologies to present these supporting facts and figures.  
The aim of this chapter is to justify the choice of research methods used and give 
reasons why they are appropriate for this research. A brief discussion in regard to 
data collection and analysis techniques that were used to carry out this study are also 
explained. In addition, a section in the chapter also explains the research question 
and its relevance to the chosen research methodology.  
3.1 Chosen Research Methodology  
Before commencing the research, the author had to choose between using qualitative 
or quantitative research methodology. The latter was selected as the appropriate 
research methodology for this study.  
Quantitative research is a deductive approach that tests a hypothetical theory or a 
research question by following a natural science model that is objective and 
measurable (COL, 2010). According to Sibandha (2009), “quantitative research 
focuses on gathering numerical data and generalising it across groups of people”. In 
this research, similar variables are compared while keeping other variables constant 
to answer the research questions. The variables are compared to numerically 
significant data. As “quantitative methods focus attention on measurements and 
amounts (more and less, larger and smaller, often and seldom, similar and 
different)” (Thomas, 2003), the collected data formulates analysis that justifies facts 
with the help of numerical figures. According to Thomas (2003) telephony surveys, 
experiments, co-relational studies and quantitative content analysis are the four types 
of quantitative research methodologies.  
As a part of quantitative research methodology, experiments were conducted to 
perform various tests involved in the research. According to Kotharia (2004), the 
principle of replication of experimental research is important. This principle states 
that the experiment should be repeated multiple times. Thus, each treatment is 
applied to many experimental units instead of just one. By doing so, the statistical 
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accuracy of the experiments is increased significantly. The next section explains why 
vulnerability assessment was used to conduct experiments and how the author 
realized the principle of replication.  
3.2 Vulnerability Assessment for Data Collection 
The research was designed in a way that would determine the most secure virtual 
DMZ design deployment. To accomplish this, different virtual DMZ designs, which 
are explained in Chapter 4, were tested in terms of network vulnerability. The 
vulnerability assessment and penetration testing methodology approach suggested by 
Alisherov & Sattarova (2009) and by Saindane (2009) was modified to collect and 
analyse data for this research.    
“Penetration testing can be defined as a security‐oriented probing of a computer 
system or network to seek out vulnerabilities that an attacker could exploit” 
Gershater & Mehta (2003). There are two types of penetration testing: black-box and 
white-box testing (Shewmaker, 2008). In Black-Box testing the penetration tester has 
no prior information of the network or the system to be tested, whereas in White-Box 
testing the penetration tester has knowledge of the network or system to simulate 
attacks (Geer & Harthorne, 2002). In addition, there are others like Mark Ciampa 
(2009) who proposes Grey-Box testing where partial knowledge of systems or 
networks being tested is known. 
Since the author of the research was the sole person involved in the setup of the 
experimental test bed and performing various vulnerability assessment tests, white-
box penetration testing techniques were used in this research. The scope of the 
research was limited to vulnerability assessment phase within white-box testing. 
The data collected from the vulnerability assessments tests performed on virtual 
DMZs was analysed to justify a secure virtual DMZ deployment. Chapter 5 presents 
the collected data used for analysis. As an outcome of data analysis conducted from 
vulnerability assessment experiments, discussions in Chapter 6 depict the results of 
the research. 
Let us take another look at the research question discussed in Section 1.5and see how 
the chosen methodology would help answer the primary research question 
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“Is it secure to implement DMZ in a virtual network infrastructure?” With the help 
of various vulnerability assessment tools, the author is able to test and justify the 
degree of security in virtualized DMZ designs from highest to lowest security levels. 
Results from vulnerability assessment experiments enable the author to state factors 
that contribute to security issues in virtualized DMZ. Mitigation strategies to achieve 
the highest possible level of security for the implementation of virtualized DMZs 
could be derived from the results of this study. The discussion in Chapter 4 briefly 
outlines variables tested to answer the above question. The steps that were taken by 
the author to conduct experiments are covered in the sub sections below.  
3.2.1 A Methodical Approach to Vulnerability Assessment 
By conducting vulnerability assessment experiments, the author approached the 
vulnerability assessment process in a sequential way. The following steps describe 
this iterative methodological approach. 
Step 1 – First a particular virtual DMZ design was determined for conducting 
the experiment.  
Step 2 – The place (node) for conducting the experiment was determined. In 
this case, it was placed outside the designed network, which replicated an 
internet user. 
Step 3–The IP address of the published website was gathered by pinging the 
website name.  
Step 4–A network scan was performed on the subnet to see any other live hosts 
on the subnet.    
Step 5–Network vulnerability assessment tools were used to scan for 
vulnerabilities on the detected hosts. This test was performed five times to scan 
for vulnerabilities on each host. This would rule out any inconsistency while 
collecting data as suggested in principle of replication (Kotharia, 2004). 
Step 6– The collected data was recorded in a benchmark matrix and compared 
to the expected values of a live host (Appendix A).  
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Step 7– Return to step 1 for conducting vulnerability assessment on the next 
design. Continue this process for all the virtual DMZ designs.   
It is very important to keep the process of vulnerability assessment methodical and 
tenacious, as at times wrong location or different approach of performing 
vulnerability assessment can generate wrong information. The steps mentioned 
above helped the author to stay within the scope and perform the experiments for this 
research.  
3.3 Summary 
This chapter described research methodology undertaken by the author to accomplish 
this research. Discussions in the chapter describe penetration testing and vulnerability 
assessment as the appropriate methods for performing experiments that are 
quantitative in nature for the research.  
With the research being experimental and quantitative, it is time to discuss the 
experimental setup. Next chapter of this thesis explains the experimental setup.   
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4 Virtual DMZ – Experimental Test Bed 
The experimental setup for the research will be discussed in this chapter. At first,the 
discussion covers the core network design and the technologies that were used to 
design the experimental setup along with their configuration settings. The core 
design remained unchanged during the whole research.  Before focussing on the 
testing tools used to conduct the experiments, the variables within the logical 
network design, which in this case are the different virtual DMZ designs are 
discussed. 
4.1 Core Network Design 
To describe the experimental setup logically, a fictitious enterprise by the name of 
“RSPS Ltd” was created. The network design within RSPS represents a fictitious 
small to medium enterprise’s network design. All network nodes, physical and 
virtual, are part of the “rsps.net” domain. The convention used for the server 
hostname is “rsps” followed by “server type & number”, e.g.:- The host name for the 
first domain controller in the rsps.net domain would be “rspsdc01” and the hostname 
for the second domain controller would be “rspsdc02”. For network devices the 
convention is “rsps_device role and number”, so the hostname for the core switch 
would be “rsps_coresw01”. List of devices and hostname is described in Appendix B 
Figure 4.1represents the logical design of the network. Please refer to Appendix B 
for a complete list of the hostname and IP address of servers and network devices 
shown in figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1-Core network design (refer Appendix B for device description) 
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Section 4.1.1 proceeds to discuss data communications. This section explains the 
logical flow of data communication in the network.  
4.1.1 Flow of Information and Data Communication 
Figure 4.1illustrates a typical local area network (LAN) design, where the public or 
the internet- facing network services were placed in the DMZ, for example the web 
server. Two scenarios were used to describe the flow of information in the network.  
Scenario 1 – Internal user requesting for www.rspstest.com  
In this scenario, a RSPS Ltd employee is trying to access www.rspstest.com, hosted 
on rspsweb01 that is RSPS Ltd’s web server and FTP server. Rspsweb01is located in 
the DMZ network. The following steps explain the data flow necessary to reach the 
web server and for the web server to present the requested page to the employee, as 
shown in Figure 4.2. 
1. Rspsclinet01 (internal users machine) requests for “www.rspstest.com”. The 
page request is forwarded to rspsdc01 (primary DNS server for the domain 
rsps.net) after inter-VLAN routing.  
2. Rspsdc01 checks it’s DNS for the “A” records and attempts to resolve the 
website address.  
3. Since “www.rspstest.com” is not a part of the rsps.net domain, the name 
resolution request is forwarded to rspsdmzdns01, which is the authoritative 
DNS for the domain.  
4. Rspsdmsdns01 resolves the address and identifies rspsweb01 as the hosting 
server for “www.rspstest.com”. 
5. After resolving the web address, rspsweb01 presents the page request to 
rspsclient01.  
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Figure 4.2- Data flow Diagram from internal client to www.rspstest.com 
Scenario 2 – External Internet user requesting for www.rspstest.com  
In this scenario an external internet users is trying to access RSPS Ltd’s website i.e. 
“www.rspstest.com”. As mentioned earlier, “www.rspstest.com” is hosted on 
rspsweb01 and the web server resides in RSPS Ltd’s DMZ. The following steps 
explain the data flow so that the external internet user can reach the web server and 
the web server can present the requested page, as shown in Figure 4.3. 
1. External internet user requests for “www.rspstest.com”. The page request 
carried to the network via the rsps_gw01 (gateway router for RSPS Ltd.) 
2. After checking its routing table the request is forwarded to rsps_extfw01 
(three leg edge firewall). 
3. rsps_extfw01 sends the page request from the external internet user to 
rspsdmzdns01 via its DMZ interface to rspsdmzdns01 
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4. Rspsdmsdns01 resolves the address and identifies rspsweb01 as the hosting 
server for “www.rspstest.com”  
5. After resolving the web address rspsweb01 presents the page request to the 
external internet user.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Data flow diagram from internet user to www.rspstest.com 
The next section of the chapter focuses on the technologies used to design the core 
network, along with their management configurations. 
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4.2 Description of Technologies 
4.2.1 Storage 
Typically, in a virtual infrastructure environment, the virtual machines are created in 
the host machine, but the configuration and the virtual hard drives of the virtual 
machines are stored in the Storage Area network (SAN) or the Network Attached 
Storage (NAS). The author chose SAN as the shared storage technology for storing 
virtual machines, as it provides the flexibility to create block level storages, i.e. 
LUNs (TechTarget, 2012). Shared storage also enables administrators to use 
advanced features like live migration. Since this was a research project with budget 
restrictions, implementing a commercial SAN device was out of scope. After some 
research, Openfiler and FreeNAS, two open source solutions, were found to present 
LUNs to the host machine over Ethernet using iSCSI. The author chose Openfiler, a 
Linux distribution under GNU license, to deploy SAN in the network.  
The hostname for the SAN was configured as “rspssan01” and the assigned 
management IP address was “192.168.1.133”. Openfiler can be managed by either 
shell over the SSH on port 22 or by web GUI by typing the host IP address in the 
web browser on port 446 i.e. “http://192.168.1.133:446”. The administrative 
username and password were configured as “Openfiler” and “ApnaVir4@”, 
respectively.  
The SAN had two network interfaces, eth0 and eth1 at 1Gbps. Both interfaces were 
teamed and aggregated to form a single logical interface. This logical interface was 
termed “bond1” and it was aggregating for a 2Gbps link speed. The assigned IP 
address for the bond1 link was 192.168.1.133, with the netmask 255.255.255.0 and 
the default gateway as 192.168.1.254.  
The SAN box represents three iSCSI LUN shares across the virtual environment that 
was visible to all ESXi hosts. The first share held the documents and files across the 
virtual network; the second share held the production network virtual machines and 
their settings. The third share held the DMZ virtual machines and their settings.   
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4.2.2 Routing and Switching 
The experimental setup represents the network of a small to medium enterprise 
network of a fictitious organization. To represent a real SME network, the 
experimental setup was divided into segments. Routing and switching was used to 
design VLANs, IP addressing and inter-VLAN routing, to enable data 
communication between different segments of the network. 
 A Cisco 2611 router was delegated as the core router for the LAN. The router was 
configured with dot1q encapsulation for inter-VLAN routing on interfaces e0/0, 
e0/0.1, e0/0.2 and e0/0.3 between the networks 192.168.0.0/24, 192.168.1.0/24, 
192.168.2.0/24 and 192.168.3.0/24. RIP version 2 was the routing protocol used in 
the network. The host name for the core router was “rsps_lanr01.rsps.net” and the 
management IP address for the router was 192.168.1.254.  
A Cisco WS-C2950T-24 was used as the core switch. VLAN 10, VLAN 20, and 
VLAN 30 were configured on the switch to divide the network. VLAN 10 was 
delegated network 192.168.1.0/24 and was used as management VLAN that 
contained VMware’s vCentre server for managing all the hosts and virtual machines 
in the virtual network infrastructure, along with the vMotion (VM live migration) 
network. SAN and monitoring traffic were also part of VLAN 10.VALN 20 was 
delegated network 192.168.2.0/24. Directory services, DNS and DHCP server and 
file server were deployed in the production VLAN, .i.e. VLAN 20. Finally, VLAN 
30 was delegated to network 192.168.3.0/24 as the Client VLAN that contained all 
the LAN clients\user machines. The host name for the core switch was 
“rsps_coresw01.rsps.net” and the management IP address for the router was 
192.168.1.253. 
Cisco 806 was used as the gateway router for the network-facing internet on interface 
e0 with the public IP address 203.168.1.254, and interface e1 facing the LAN. The 
host name for the gateway switch was “rsps_gw01.rsps.net” and the management IP 
address for the router was192.168.8.254. 
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4.2.3 Directory Services, DNS Server &DHCP Server 
Active directory-directory services (AD DS) were configured on a windows server 
2008 32-bit virtual machine as the directory services for authentication and managing 
network resources. The primary DNS and DHCP server were also configured on the 
same VM. The VM was assigned “Rspsdc01.rsps.net” as the host name with an IP 
address of 192.168.2.100.  
All nodes and servers in RSPS Ltd’s network were part of the rsps.net domain. 
Rsps.net was also the default forward lookup zone for the domain. “1.168.192.in-
addr.arpa, 2.168.192.in-addr.arpa, 3.168.192.in-addr.arpa and 7.168.192.in-
addr.arpa“, were the configured reverse lookup zones in the DNS server. The 
forward and the reverse lookup zones were replicated across to 
“rspsdmzdns01.rsps.net”which was the secondary DNS server sitting in the DMZ 
that also was the authoritative DNS server for the network. The DHCP service on 
“rspsdc01.rsps.net” was configured to publish 192.168.3.0/24 as the scope for 
leasing IP addresses to the client network. 
The secondary DNS server “rspsdmzdns01.rsps.net,” also a windows server 2008 
32-bit VM, was the primary DNS server for the rspstest.com domain that hosts the 
domain name for RSPS Ltd’s website and FTP site (www.rspstest.com & 
ftp.rspstest.com). 192.168.7.105 was the secondary DNS’s IP address.  
4.2.4 File Server Services 
The file services role was configured on a Windows server 2008 32-bit virtual 
machine. The host name for the file server was rspsfil01.rsps.net and the IP address 
for the file server was 192.168.2.101. The server published two shares, 
“rsps.net\adminshare” for the network administrators, and “rsps.net\rsps_share01” 
for the network users to share files across the network. “\\rsps.net” was configured 
as the root DFS share.  
4.2.5 Web & FTP Services 
A 32-bit Windows server 2008 was setup to host RSPS Ltd’s web- and FTP site. The 
Windows IIS service was configured to host the sites. The host name for the server 
was“rspsweb01.rsps.net”, with an IP address of 192.168.7.115. Two hosted sites on 
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the server were “www.rspstest.com” and “ftp.rspstest.com.” TCP/IP port 80 and 21 
were enabled on the server, to allow connection to the web site and the FTP site, 
respectively. The server was deployed in the DMZ with 
“rspsdmzdns01.rsps.net”beingthe primary DNS server.  
4.2.6 Clients 
The client machines were kept in the 192.168.3.0/24 network as a part of VLAN 30 
with the rspsdc01 as the directory services authentication server, DNS server and 
DHCP server.   
4.2.7 Firewall 
Firewalls play a very important role in deploying secure networks and give network 
engineers the ability to design DMZ zones. The reason behind designing DMZs is to 
keep internet-facing network services separated from the LAN or the production 
network.  
The author has chosen “PfSense” as the firewall for designing RSPS Ltd’s DMZ. 
PfSense is a FreeBSD-based firewall distribution project that was launched in 2004 
(BSD Perimeter, 2011) Two firewalls were deployed to design the DMZ. The first 
PfSense firewall was a three-tiered firewall with one interface facing the internet 
users, the second interfacing facing the internal network and the third interface facing 
the DMZ. The second firewall is placed within the DMZ for designing separate trust 
zones. Figure 4.4illustrates the logical deployment of these two firewalls.  
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Figure 4.4- Logical DMZ Design  
 
37 
 
4.3 Virtual DMZ designs 
The aim of this research was to identify secure deployment options for designing 
virtualized DMZs in a network using VMware’s ESXi as the server virtualization 
technology. In a white paper published by VMware, they suggested that the 
virtualization technology itself is secure; however the design misconfigurations are 
the biggest security risk while deploying virtualized DMZs (VMware, 2008). 
VMware suggests three virtual DMZ designs. The author assessed all three DMZ 
designs in terms of security using different security assessment techniques to verify 
VMware’s statement.  The following sections will explain the three DMZ designs in 
more detail. 
4.3.1 Design 1 - Partially Collapsed DMZ with physical trust zones 
In the first DMZ design suggested by VMware, physical ESXi servers are separated 
by physical firewalls.  This design is considered to be least complex. The DMZ is 
divided into different security trust zones with physical firewalls between each 
physical ESXi server cluster. The virtual machines that are part of the external trust 
zone are kept on the same ESXi server and are separated from the internal trust zone 
with the help of a physical firewall.  Similarly, the virtual machines that are part of 
the internal trust zone are kept separated with the help of a physical firewall on the 
same physical ESXi server. Figure 4.1illustrates this design. 
 
Figure 4.5– Logical design of a partially collapsed DMZ with physical trust zones 
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Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7show the networking configurations of host 1 and host 2, done 
using VMware’s vCentre server to set up apartially collapsed DMZ with physical 
trust zones.  
 
Figure 4.6– Networking configuration of Host 1 designed to attain a partially collapsed DMZ 
with physical trust zones, attained using VMware’s vCentre. 
 
Figure 4.7– Networking configuration of Host 2 designed to attain a partially collapsed DMZ 
with physical trust zones, attained using VMware’s vCentre.  
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4.3.2 Design 2 - Partially Collapsed DMZ with virtual separation of trust 
zones 
In this design the trust zones are separated with the help of physical firewalls. 
However, the design is different from Design 1 in terms of deploying virtual 
machines. In this design, both, external and internal trust zone virtual machines are 
kept on the same host. VMware’s ESXi server’s inbuilt virtual switches are used to 
enforce separation of trust zones within the design. Each virtual switch has dedicated 
NICs that are separated from the other NICs on the same physical server, with the 
help of physical firewalls. Virtual machines that are part of the external trust zone are 
connected to the external zone’s virtual switch. This virtual switch is connected to 
the dedicated NIC for the external zone on the physical host. Similar configurations 
are also done for the internal trust zone. Any communication between external and 
internal trust zone VMs has to pass through physical firewalls. Figure 4.8illustrates 
this design.  
 
Figure 4.8– Logical design of a partially collapsed DMZ with virtual separation of trust zones. 
Figure 4.9 shows the networking configurations of host 1 and host 2, done using 
VMware’s vCentre server to set up a partially collapsed DMZ with physical trust 
zones. 
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Figure 4.9– Networking configuration of Host 1 designed to attain a partially collapsed DMZ 
with virtual separation of trust zones, attained using VMware’s vCentre.  
4.3.3 Design 3 - Fully Collapsed DMZ 
A fully collapsed DMZ is the most complex design in terms of designing virtual 
DMZ trust zones using VMware. In this design, all virtual machines are deployed on 
the same physical host. Along with the virtual machines, the firewalls are also 
deployed on the same physical host. This means the firewalls are virtual firewall 
appliances within VMware’s ESXi server. In this design, one NIC of the physical 
host is dedicated to the internet traffic and the second NIC is dedicated to the 
production LAN traffic. The external and internal DMZ trust zones do not have NICs 
associated with them. They are separated with the help of dedicated virtual switches 
and virtual firewalls that filter the traffic passing between the two trust zones and the 
rest of the network. Figure 4.10illustrates this design. 
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Figure 4.10– Logical design of a Fully Collapsed DMZ 
 
Figure 4.11– Networking configuration of Host 1 designed to attain a fully collapsed DMZ with 
physical trust zones, attained using VMware’s vCentre. 
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4.3.4 Design 4–Traditional Physical DMZ 
In a traditional DMZ, the network infrastructure consists of physical servers and 
physical firewalls. Typically, in a traditional DMZ design, as shown in Figure 4.12 , 
the web/FTP server and the DNS server are separated from the database server with 
the help of a hardware firewall appliance (physical firewall). The external trust zone 
servers are connected to a dedicated physical switch and the physical servers, as part 
of the internal trust zone, are connected to a separated dedicated physical switch.  
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Zone
Internal Trust 
Zone
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Figure 4.12– Logical Design of a Traditional Physical DMZ 
The next section discusses the different vulnerability assessment tools that were used 
to conduct experiments for this study. 
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4.4 Vulnerability Assessment Tools 
Five vulnerability assessment tools were used to identify which virtual DMZ design 
was the most secure one. The following section gives a brief description of the tools 
and their assessment framework. The individual steps necessary to perform the 
experiments with each tool are also discussed briefly. These tools were selected 
based on their exploit database as some of them use exploits based on OVAL (open 
vulnerability assessment language) 
4.4.1 Tool 1 - NMAP 
NMAP, also known as “Network Mapper” is an open source network scanning and 
probing tool.  It uses raw IP packets to discover hosts on the network. Besides 
discovering hosts on the network, it also scans the host for open ports and enabled 
services on the host along with operating system identification. It also helps to 
determine what type of packet, filters or firewalls are used on the host 
("Introduction," 2011).The commands used to carry out the vulnerability assessment 
using NMAP are listed in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1- Commands used to conduct vulnerability assessments using nmap. 
Switch Function of the Switch 
“nmap –T4 –A –v 192.168.1.20”   for intense scan of the host 
“nmap –sS –sU –A –v 192.168.1.20”   for intense UDP scan 
“nmap –p 1-65535 –T4 –A –v 
192.168.1.20”  
 for intense scanning of TCP 
ports and services running on 
open ports 
“nmap –sn –traceroute 192.168.1.20”   for quick trace route scan 
“nmap –O –osscan-guess 192.168.1.20” 
& “nmap –O –osscan-limit 
192.168.1.20” 
 for scanning operating system 
footprint 
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Figure 4.13 - Sample output of TCP scan executed with nmap shell  
4.4.2 Tool 2 - Tenable Nessus Vulnerability scanner 
Nessus is an active network scanner that conducts high-speed vulnerability 
discovery, configuration auditing and asset profiling. The Nessus server can be 
deployed on Windows, Linux or UNIX clients to scan the network, and presents host 
discovery reports with open ports and OS fingerprints ("Compliance Checks," 2011). 
Following screenshots describe the scans done with Nessus.  
 
Figure 4.14- Screenshot showing how to select a scanning policy and add a screen target by 
setting/selecting the parameters as shown (name, type, policy, scan targets). 
 
Figure 4.15- Screenshot showing a launch button to initiate the scan on the specified target  
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Figure 4.16- Screenshot showing generated report of open ports on scanned host selected in 
figure 4.14 
 
Figure 4.17- Screenshot showing generated report of services on the host’s open port 
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Figure 4.18-Screenshot of Nessus showing detailed description of service running on the host's 
open ports. 
4.4.3 Tool 3 - GFI LANguard 
GFI LANguard is a network scanner that performs over 45000vulnerability checks 
based on OVAL Framework and SANS Top 20. Scans in GFI LANguard help 
identify patch management, vulnerability assessment; risk analysis and compliance 
on network nodes ("GFI LANGuard, " 2011).  The following screenshots 
demonstrate the scans done with GFI LANguard. 
 
Figure 4.19- GFI LANguard start-up screen to initiate a scan. User can either select pre-build 
scan or can create a custom scan.  
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Figure 4.20- Custom scan parameters to initiate a scan on remote host with IP 192.168.1.20 
 
Figure 4.21- If the credentials are known for the remote host enter these or else the tool will scan 
as an anonymous user  
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Figure 4.22- Screenshot showing the results of a successful scan on a remote host with GFI 
LANguard 
4.4.4 Tool 4 - Shadow Security Scanner 
“Shadow Security Scanner”, a Safety Lab product, is a network security vulnerability 
assessment scanner. The tool audits over 5000 vulnerabilities. The “Shadow Security 
Scanner” analyses the collected data and compares them to 5000 predefined 
vulnerability audits. The tool locates vulnerabilities and possible errors within the 
server configuration. The tool also suggests possible solutions to eliminate 
vulnerabilities and misconfiguration. “Shadow Security Scanner employs a unique 
system security analysis algorithm based on a patented "intellectual core".("Shadow 
Security Scanner." 2011).The following screenshots demonstrate the scans done with 
shadow security scanner 
 
Figure 4.23- Initial start-up screen to start a new scan with Shadow Security Scanner tool 
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Figure 4.24- Select a new scan type from the list of pre-build or add a new custom scan.  In this 
screenshot a full scan is selected. 
 
Figure 4.25 - Screenshot showing the parameters to select target machines. In this screenshot, 
remote host with an IP address of 192.168.7.115 was determined as the selected target. 
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Figure 4.26- Screenshot showing the results generated by Shadow Security Scanner 
4.4.5 Tool 5 - X- Scan 
X-Scan is a network vulnerability scanner that uses a multi-threaded method to scan 
a specific IP address scope or even a stand-alone computer, to determine 
vulnerabilities. X-Scan includes all the attack scripts from Nessus. It can determine 
features like service type, remote OS type, version number and weak system passwords. 
The tool scans for most known vulnerabilities, describes their corresponding description 
and suggests repairs for vulnerabilities that were found. It comprises command line and 
GUI front-end to perform scans. X-Scan scan features are listed below - 
 Remote OS type and version detection,  
 Standard port status and banner information,  
 SNMP information,  
 CGI vulnerability detection,  
 IIS vulnerability detection,  
 RPC vulnerability detection,  
 SSL vulnerability detection,  
 SQL-server,  
 FTP-server,  
 SMTP-server,  
 POP3-server,  
 NT-server weak user/password pairs authentication module,  
 NT server NETBIOS information,  
 Remote Register information, etc. “(XScan,2011) 
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The following screenshots demonstrate the scans done with X-Scan. 
 
Figure 4.27- Initial Start-up screen for X-Scan. To set scan parameter and target machine click 
on the second blue button from the left and add the host IP address.  
 
Figure 4.28- Press green play button, i.e. is the third button from the screen to initiate the scan. 
Screen shot also shows the results of the scan in the left hand pane.  
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4.5 Summary 
A detailed description of the technologies used and their configuration is discussed in 
this chapter. The chapter discusses the core logical design and the various Virtualized 
DMZ designs used for conducting experiments. A section in the chapter also 
discussed various vulnerability assessment tools like nmap, nessus and GFI 
LANguard etc. The procedure required to generate the result from these tools in also 
mentioned in the chapter. Next chapter focuses on analysing data, generated from 
reports produced by the vulnerability assessment tools. 
 
  
53 
 
5 Data Analysis 
As discussed in Section 4.5 of the previous chapter, five vulnerability assessment 
tools were used to generate data for three different virtual DMZ designs, along with a 
physical DMZ design. The vulnerability assessment tools were placed outside the 
network. The traffic generated by these tools was to simulate an internet user, i.e. 
from outside the network as described in scenario 2 Section 4.2.1). The web server 
“rspsweb01”, hosting the website "www.rspstest.com", with the IP address 
192.168.7.115, was identified as the target server for analysing the level of weakness 
in each design.  As discussed in Appendix A, six host parameters were considered as 
the benchmark for comparing the results generated by the tools under each DMZ 
design (refer section 4.3for DMZ designs). 
The following sections of this chapter discuss the data analysis for each vulnerability 
assessment tool of the individual DMZ designs. The data analysis process involved 
comparing the results generated by each vulnerability assessment tool, to the 
benchmark matrix, which was described in Appendix A. Bar diagrams were 
generated after comparing the results with the benchmark matrix. The designed 
histograms depict green, yellow and red as the three levels of vulnerabilities on a 
scale range of 1 to 4. Scale range of 1 to 2 is represented by green colour and 
suggests a minimal level of vulnerability on the target machine. The scale range of 
2.1 to 3 is represented in yellow and suggests a moderate level of vulnerability. 
Finally, the scale range of 3.1 to 4 is shown as red and represents the highest level of 
vulnerability identified on the target machine. E.g. in Appendix A the known values 
of "open ports" parameters is TCP port 80 and UDP port 53. If the vulnerability 
assessment tool detects both these values correctly then the level of vulnerability for 
this parameter was determined as 4. If the tool detected one value correctly and the 
second was not detected then the level of vulnerability was determined between 2.1 
to 3. If the tool was unable to detect any values then the level of vulnerability was 
determined to be 1. 
During data collection, the vulnerability assessment tools detected some unexpected 
values for the vulnerability parameters. As these values appeared frequently 
throughout data analysis, they are briefly explained in Table 5.1 before carrying on 
with the presentation of results. 
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Parameter Value Description 
Hostname  Rspstest.com  Rspstest.com was the published website name of 
the website running on the web server named 
rspsweb01.rsp.net placed in the DMZ as the target 
machine. 
OS Type  Windows NT  x.x  This was the value detected by one of the 
vulnerability assessment tools to represent a 
Windows NT style operating system during 
vulnerability scan.  
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.10.253 
 192.168.7.115 
 203.168.1.254 is the external Public IP of the 
gateway 
 192.168.10.253 is the IP address of the firewall 
interface where IP port filtering is enabled  
 192.168.7.115 is the IP address of the target 
machine 
Route  203.168.1.50 
 192.168.1.254 
 ? 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 203.168.1.50 was the IP address of the machine 
from where the attacks were carried 
 192.168.1.254 was the default gateway of 
192.168.1.0/24 subnet  
 “?” donates that the vulnerability assessment tool 
wasn’t able to find the other IPs  but suggested 
there were potentially more IP address between 
the attacker machine and target machine  
 192.168.7.115 is the IP address of the target 
machine 
MAC 
Address  
 00-02-17-63-0A-
14 
 Some tools detected MAC address of external 
interface of gateway router as the MAC address 
of the target machine. The IP address on this 
interface was assigned as 203.168.1.254 
Note– Refer Figure 4.1 of Chapter 4 for a detailed description of the network diagram 
Table 5.1. Frequently detected unexpected values for the vulnerability parameters (hostname, 
OS type, route and MAC address) detected by the vulnerability assessment tools. 
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5.1 Vulnerability Assessment – A Tool Based Data Analysis 
Each vulnerability assessment tool targeted the host “rspsweb01” under each DMZ 
design five times. This enabled the author to build an average output for the 
vulnerabilities discovered by the tools and helped remove any inconsistency during 
data collection. The average result for each DMZ design will be discussed in the 
following chapters. 
5.1.1 Design 1 - Partially Collapsed DMZ with physical trust zones 
The vulnerability of Design 1, as described in 4.3.1, was analysed using X-Scan, the 
Shadow Security Scanner, GFI Languard, Network Mapper and the Nessus 
Vulnerability Scanner. In the following sections the results of these individual 
analyses will be discussed in detail.  
5.1.1.1 X-Scan  
TCP port 80 and UDP port 53 were the actual open ports on the server rspsweb01. X-
Scan accurately detected both, TCP port 80 and UDP port 53, as open ports. X-Scan 
also correctly detected 192.168.7.115 as the server’s IP address, but it detected 
rspstest.com as the host name and Windows NT x.x as the operating system for the 
server. X-Scan failed to detect the server’s MAC address, i.e.  00-0c-29-88-0e-48. 
Although X-Scan was unsuccessful in detecting the enabled DNS service on the 
server; the tool correctly detected the enabled HTTP service as shown in Table 5.2 
X-Scan’s detected route results were not very accurate, as could be seen when 
comparing X-Scan’s results to the actual route for the server. In addition, the tool 
was not able to detect any firewalls protecting the direct connectivity to the server.  
With the results generated by X-Scan, as show in Table 5.2, a diagram showing the 
level of vulnerability detected by X-Scan could be generated (Figure 5.1).   
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Table 5.2. Comparison of server configuration setup values for DMZ Design 1 and values 
detected by X-Scan. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values X-Scan Detected 
Setup Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 53 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Windows NT x.x 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  Not Detected 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Detected 
 Not Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 
 203.168.1.254 
 192.168.10.253 
 192.168.7.115 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Not Detected 
 
The results depicted in Figure 5.1clearly show that the biggest vulnerability that 
could lead to potential penetration was the detection of open ports.  The level of 
vulnerability for open ports, as detected by X-Scan is level 4. The identified level of 
vulnerability in reference to the detection of the server route is 3.5 on the scale, as X-
Scan discovered the route to the server, but the values were not completely accurate.  
As shown by the yellow bars, the detection of the OS fingerprint and the enabled 
server services were moderately vulnerable. The level of vulnerability was between 2 
to 3.  X-Scan was unable to detect a MAC address or firewall protecting the server. 
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Therefore, the level of vulnerability for MAC address and firewall detection, was 
calculated to be below 2. 
 
Figure 5.1- Vulnerability levels of a partially collapsed DMZ with physical trust zones detected 
by X-Scan. The open ports and the route were the most vulnerable parameters detected (red), 
OS Finger Prints and services showed an intermediate level of vulnerability (yellow). The MAC 
address and the firewall were not detected (green). 
5.1.1.2 Shadow Security Scanner (SSS)  
Looking at Table 5.3it is obvious that SSS successfully detected TCP port 80 and 
UDP port 53. SSS had no problem detecting 192.168.7.115 as the server’s IP 
address, but was unsuccessful detecting the server’s hostname.  
Unlike X-Scan, that detected Windows as the operating system type, SSS was not 
able to detect any operating system type.  SSS also failed to detect the MAC address 
and enabled DNS service of the server.  
Although SSS suggested the server route was two hops away from the scan launch 
point, it was successful in detecting the correct HTTP service running on the server.  
However, SSS was unable to detect any firewall protecting the server.  
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Table 5.3 - Comparison of server configuration setup values of Design 1 and values detected by 
SSS. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values SSS Detected Setup 
Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 53 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Not Detected 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  Not Detected 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Detected 
 Not Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 
 Suggested 2 hops 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Not Detected 
 
As shown in Table 5.3 the MAC address and Firewall detection were the least 
vulnerable parameters. According to the results detected by the Super Shadow 
Scanner, the level of vulnerability for the two parameters was determined to be below 
2 in the histogram.   
As seen in the case of X-Scan, opened TCP/IP ports were successfully detected by 
SSS. This means that the level of vulnerability for this parameter was determined as 
4 on the scale.  
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SSS was only able to suggest that the server was only 2 hops away from the point 
where the scan was launched and was unable to suggest any IP addresses for the 
hops, therefore the level of vulnerability for the server route was determined as 2.  
The level of vulnerability for operating system fingerprint was determined as 2.3, as 
only the IP address of the server was detected. SSS was able to detect one out of two 
enabled services on the server. Therefore the level of vulnerability for this parameter 
was determined as 2.5.  
 
Figure 5.2- Vulnerability levels of a partially collapsed DMZ with physical trust zones detected 
by SSS. The open ports were the most vulnerable parameters detected (red). OS Finger Prints, 
services and routes showed an intermediate level of vulnerability (yellow) and the MAC address 
and the firewall were not detected at all (green). 
5.1.1.3 GFI Languard 
Unlike other scanning tools, GFI Languard, hereafter referred to as “GFI”, was 
unable to detect any open TCP/IP ports (Table 5.4). While detecting the operating 
system footprint, GFI was able to identify 192.168.7.115 as the IP address and 
Windows as the operating system. GFI wrongly detected 00-02-17-63-0A-14as the 
MAC of the server. 00-0c-29-88-0e-48was the actual MAC address of the server).  
However, the tool successfully detected the running HTTP service on the server but 
was unable to detect any protecting firewall and DNS service on the server. As can 
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be seen in Table 5.3, the routes detected by GFI were not as accurate as the actual 
route to the server. 
Table 5.4 - Comparison of server configuration values of DMZ Design 1 and values detected by 
GFI Languard. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values GFI Detected Setup 
Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 Not Detected 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Windows (no 
version) 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  00-02-17-63-0A-
14 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Detected 
 Not Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 
 203.168.1.254 
 192.168.10.253 
 192.168.7.115 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Not Detected 
 
In Figure 5.3 the three parameters coloured in green reflect the lowest level of 
vulnerability. These three parameters are detected open ports on the server, the 
server’s MAC address and the detection of any firewall protecting the server. The 
level of vulnerability for the three parameters was 1.5, 1.8 and 1.2, respectively. The 
level of vulnerability for the server MAC address was 1.8, because GFI detected the 
MAC address of the gateway router, but not the server’s MAC address as depicted in 
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Table 5.4.  Since GFI retrieved some information on the design, the level of 
vulnerability was considered to be at a minimum.  
The level of vulnerability for the operating system fingerprint was determined to be 
2.7, as GFI was able to detect the server’s correct IP address and operating system 
type. GFI also correctly identified the HTTP service running on the server, but failed 
to detect any DNS service on the server. Therefore, the level of vulnerability was 
determined to be 2.5 for the services parameter.  
Finally, GFI managed to identify a route to the server. Although the route was not the 
expected one, the tool still managed to reach the server to scan via the identified 
route. Thus, 3.1 was determined as the level of vulnerability for the route parameter, 
making it the most vulnerable parameter as suggested by GFI LANguard scans. 
 
Figure 5.3- Vulnerability levels of a partially collapsed DMZ with physical trust zones detected 
by GFI Languard. The route was determined to be the most vulnerable (red), the OS finger 
print and the services showed an intermediate level of vulnerability (yellow) and the open ports, 
the MAC address and the firewall were not detected by GFI (green). 
5.1.1.4 Network Mapper (Nmap) 
Nmap successfully detected TCP port 80 and UDP port 53(see Table 5.4). The tool 
also successfully detected the correct version of HTTP and the DNS service running 
on the servers.  While gathering the operating system finger print information, Nmap 
successfully identified 192.168.7.115 as the IP address and Windows 2008 as the OS 
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type. But Nmap incorrectly detected rspstest.com as the host name for the server 
while it should be rspsweb01.rsps.net.  
Moreover, Nmap was unable to detect the MAC address for the server.  Unlike other 
tools, Nmap was able to suggest that there is a firewall protecting the server. Like 
most of the other tools, the route detected by Nmap was not completely correct, but 
was still informative. It suggested 203.168.1.254>192.168.10.253 > 192.168.7.115 as 
the route to the server. 
Table 5.5 - Comparison of server configuration setup values of DMZ Design 1 and parameter 
values detected by Nmap. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values Nmap Detected Setup 
Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 53 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Windows Server 
2008 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  Not Detected 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Detected 
 Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 
 203.168.1.254 
 192.168.10.253 
 192.168.7.115 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Firewall Detected  
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From the results in Table 5.5, a bar diagram was designed to illustrate the level of 
vulnerability for Design 1 detected by Nmap (Figure 5.4). Nmap detected that open 
ports, OS finger prints, services and routes to the server were the highly vulnerable 
parameters, with the level of vulnerability being 4, 3.8, 4 and 3.1, respectively. Thus, 
using Nmap the vulnerability of Design 1 was found to be high. 
The level of vulnerability for the MAC address detection was 1, because Nmap was 
not able to detect any MAC address. Surprisingly, Nmap detected the existence of a 
firewall protecting the server, unlike all other tools discussed so far. Therefore, 3 was 
the level of vulnerability determined for this parameter. 
 
Figure 5.4- Vulnerability levels of a partially collapsed DMZ with physical trust zones detected 
by Network Mapper. Nmap detected open ports; OS finger prints, services and routes (red), 
making the DMZ design highly vulnerable. A firewall protecting the server was found (yellow), 
but Nmap was unable to detect the MAC address. 
5.1.1.5 Nessus Vulnerability Scanner 
The scan results generated by the Nessus Security Scanner, hereafter referred to as 
“Nessus”, suggest that TCP port 80 and UDP port 53 were detected successfully (see 
Table 5.6).  Along with successful detection of open ports, Nessus was able to 
determine 192.168.7.117 as the correct IP address of the server. 
Although Nessus detected Microsoft as the enabled HTTP service, it was unable to 
determine the version of the service. The tool was also not able to determine the DNS 
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service running on the server. The route suggested by Nessus was 203.168.1.50 to 
192.168.1.254 to “?” to 192.168.7.115. However, Nessus successfully detected the 
placement of a firewall in front of the rspsweb01 server. 
Table 5.6- Comparison of server configuration setup values of DMZ Design 1 and values 
detected by the Nessus Vulnerability Scanner. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values Nessus  Detected 
Setup Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 53 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Not Detected 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  Not Detected 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Microsoft 
 Not Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 203.168.1.50 
 192.168.1.254 
 ? 
 192.168.7.115 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Firewall Detected 
 
In Table 5.6 it can be seen that the level of vulnerability for open ports detected by 
Nessus was the highest: compared to the other tools mentioned in the previous 
sections.  According to the results shown in Table 5.6, 4 (on a scale of 1 to 4) was 
determined as the level of vulnerability for the parameter, because Nessus correctly 
detected both open ports on the server. The second highest vulnerability detected by 
Nessus was the route to the server. A vulnerability level of 3.3 was determined for 
this parameter.  
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Like Nmap, Nessus was the only other tool that was able to determine a firewall 
protecting the target server. This was very important for the information gathering 
stage, as it enables a hacker to look for an appropriate hacking method to bypass the 
firewall in order to attack the server. Therefore, the level of vulnerability for this 
parameter was determined as 3.  
The OS fingerprint of the server and the services running on the server were 
classified as moderately vulnerable parameters. Level 2.1 and 2.5, respectively, were 
determined for these two parameters.  Level 1 was determined as the level of 
vulnerability for the MAC address parameter, since Nessus was not able to detect the 
MAC address of the target server, like most other tools. 
 
Figure 5.5- Vulnerability levels of a partially collapsed DMZ with physical trust zones detected 
by the Nessus Vulnerability Scanner. Nessus detected the two open ports and routes to the 
server (red), as well as the OS finger print and a firewall protecting the target server (yellow). 
However, Nessus was unable to detect the MAC address (green).  
 
 
 
 
1
2
3
4
Open ports OS Finger
Prints
MAC
Address
Services Route Firewall
Detection
Le
ve
l o
f 
V
u
ln
e
ra
b
ili
ty
 
Vulnerability Parameters  
Nessus 
66 
 
5.1.2 Design 2 - Partially Collapsed DMZ with virtual separation of trust 
zones 
In the following sections the vulnerability scan data for DMZ Design 2, generated by 
X-Scan, the Shadow Security Scanner, GFI LANguard, Network Mapper and the 
Nessus Vulnerability Scanner will be discussed. The results given by each 
vulnerability assessment tool will be discussed in detail concerning the numeric 
value assigned to each vulnerability parameter (on a scale from 1 to 4).  
5.1.2.1 X-Scan  
In Design 2, X-Scan was able to detect the open TCP port 80 and UDP for 53 
successfully. As shown in Table 5.7, the scan tool also successfully detected 
192.168.7.115 as the IP address of the server. On the other hand, X-Scan was not 
able to identify rspsweb01.rsps.net as the host name for the target machine; it 
detected rspstest.com as the hostname for the target server. X-Scan successfully 
detected Windows as the operating system on the target server, but was unable to 
identify Windows Server 2008 as the OS version on the server. 
Furthermore, X-Scan successfully detected the HTTP service version running on the 
server, but failed to detect the DNS service version.  The scan tool was also unable to 
detect the firewall protecting the server and the MAC address of the server. The route 
to target the server from X-Scan’s launch source was 203.168.1.254 to 
192.168.10.253 to 192.168.7.115, which was inconsistent with the actual route 
values. 
  
67 
 
Table 5.7 - Comparison of server configuration parameters of DMZ Design 2 and parameter 
values detected by X-Scan. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values X-Scan  Detected 
Setup Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 53 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Windows NT x.x 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  Not Detected 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Detected 
 Not Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 203.168.1.254 
 192.168.10.253 
 192.168.7.115 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Not Detected 
In Figure 5.6, it can be clearly seen that the open ports was the most vulnerable 
parameter detected by X-Scan. The level of vulnerability for open ports was as high 
as 4 on the scale. The OS fingerprint and the route were the second most vulnerable 
parameters with a level of vulnerability of 3.2 each. 
The level of vulnerability for the services parameter was 2.5, because one service 
was detected correctly and the other was left undetected, as can be seen in Figure 5.6.  
Since X-Scan was not able to determine the MAC address and the firewall, the level 
of vulnerability for both parameters was minimal. This suggests that an exploit based 
on the MAC address or the firewall is highly unlikely.   
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Figure 5.6- Vulnerability levels of a partially collapsed DMZ with virtual separation of trust 
zones detected by SSS. The open ports were the most vulnerable parameters detected (red). OS 
Finger Prints, services and routes showed an intermediate level of vulnerability (yellow) and the 
MAC address and the firewall were not detected at all (green). 
5.1.2.2 Shadow Security Scanner 
The scan results produced by SSS were not 100% correct, but yielded sufficient basic 
information for a hacker to start exploiting the target machine (see Table 5.8). The 
scan tool successfully detected TCP port 80 and UDP port 53 as the opened TCP/IP 
ports on the target server.   
Although SSS could not detect the hostname and the OS type for the server, it 
successfully detected 192.168.7.115 as the IP address of the server.  SSS detected 
Microsoft IIS as the HTTP service enabled on the server and Windows 2003/2008 as 
the DNS service of the server. As can be seen from Table 5.8, the services detected 
by SSS were not very accurate, but still gave some relevant information.  
However, SSS failed to detect all the other parameters. It could not detect the route to 
the server or the MAC address. SSS also failed to detect any firewall protecting the 
server.  
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Table 5.8- Comparison of server configuration setup values of Design 2 and values detected by 
SSS. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values SSS Detected Setup 
Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 53 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Not Detected 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  Not Detected 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Microsoft IIS 
 Windows 
2000/2003 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 Not Detected 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Not Detected 
Figure 5.7 shows the level of vulnerability, determined by SSS for the selected 
parameters. Based on the scan results (see Table 5.8), Figure 5.7 depicts the level of 
vulnerability for Design 2. The most vulnerable parameter is the open ports with a 
vulnerability level of 4. 
The level of vulnerability for the services parameter is 2.9, as SSS detected both 
services, but failed to detect the version of the service. For the OS finger print 
parameter the level of vulnerability was 2.7, because SSS gave the IP address and the 
hostname, but could not produce any result for the OS type. As for the MAC address, 
the route and the firewall detection parameter, the tool was not able to generate any 
data. Therefore, the level of vulnerability for all three parameters was 1. 
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Figure 5.7- Vulnerability levels of a partially collapsed DMZ with virtual separation of trust 
zones detected by SSS. The open ports were the most vulnerable parameters detected (red). OS 
Finger Prints and the services showed an intermediate level of vulnerability (yellow) and the 
MAC address, the routes and the firewall were either not detected at all or inaccurately (green). 
5.1.2.3 GFI LANguard 
Unlike other scanning tools, GFI failed to detect any open ports on the server. GFI 
successfully detected 192.168.7.115 as the host IP address and Windows as the OS 
type of the server (Table 5.9).  The tool was unsuccessful in determining 
“rspsweb01.rsps.net” as the host name. Surprisingly, GFI Languard detected “00-02-
17-63-0A-14” as the MAC address for the server as opposed to “00-0c-29-88-0e-48”, 
which would have been correct. 
However, GFI was successful in detecting “httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp)” as the 
correct version of HTTP service enabled on the server. On the other hand, it failed to 
determine any DNS service on the server.   
The scan conducted by GFI suggested that the route for target machine was 2 hops 
away from the scan point, whereas from Table 5.9 it can be clearly seen, that it is 3 
hops away. GFI also failed to detect the existence of any firewall. 
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Table 5.9- Comparison of server configuration values of DMZ Design 2 and values detected by 
GFI LANguard. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values GFI LANguard 
Detected Setup 
Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 Not Detected 
 Not Detected 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Windows (no 
version) 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  00-02-17-63-0A-
14 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Detected 
 Not Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 Suggests 2 hops 
away 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Not Detected 
In Figure 5.8 it can be seen that GFI LANguard suggested no high vulnerability risk 
to the target machine. The highest risk factor amongst the six parameters in this case 
was the OS fingerprint with a vulnerability level of 2.7, followed by the services with 
2.5. 
The level of vulnerability for the firewall detection was determined as 2 on the scale, 
since GFI detected a firewall protecting the server, but determined no firewall type. 
The MAC address parameter was set at 1.8, as GFI detected “00-02-17-63-0A-14”, 
which is the gateway’s MAC addresses (see Figure 4.1). 
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The level of vulnerability for the route parameter was 1.5, as GFI suggested that the 
target machine is 2 hops away. In addition, since the tool failed to detect any open 
port on the server, the level of vulnerability for the open port parameter was 
determined to be1. 
 
Figure 5.8- Vulnerability levels of a partially collapsed DMZ with virtual separation of trust 
zones detected by GFI LANguard. The OS Finger Prints and the services pose an intermediate 
level of vulnerability (yellow) and the open ports, the MAC address, the route to the server and 
the firewall (green) were either inaccurately detected or not detected at all. 
5.1.2.4 Nmap 
The vulnerability scan by Nmap produced a signification amount of data that could 
be used to carry out an exploit (see Table 5.10). It detected the Windows Server 2008 
as the operating system running the HTTP service “httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp)” 
and the DNS service “Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001” on the target server.  Nmap also 
detected port 80 and 53 as the opened TCP and UDP ports on the server. These scans 
also suggested the existence of a firewall and 192.168.7.115 as the IP address of the 
server. The route to target machine detected by Nmap was 203.168.1.254 to 
192.168.10.253 to 192.168.7.115, which was not accurate, but indicates the existence 
of other devices in the network.  However, Nmap failed to detect the host’s MAC 
address and the host for the server.  
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Table 5.10 - Comparison of server setup values and values detected by Nmap for DMZ Design 2. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values Nmap Detected Setup 
Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 53 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Windows Server 
2008 ( 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  
 Not Detected 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Detected 
 Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 203.168.1.254 
 192.168.10.253 
 192.168.7.115 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Firewall Detected 
(Linux based) 
 
In Figure 5.9 it can be seen that the open port and service parameters were deemed to 
be the most vulnerable parameters detected by Nmap. The level of vulnerability for 
both parameters is 4, because Nmap detected both parameters correctly.  
The level of vulnerability of the OS fingerprint parameter was determined to be 3.5. 
The reason for this was that Nmap detected the IP address and the OS type of the 
target machine correctly, which is very valuable information that can be used by 
hackers.  
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Furthermore, the route parameter was determined to be 3.1. For the firewall, 
detection parameter the level of vulnerability was 3, because Nmap suggested that 
there is a Linux firewall protecting the target machine.  
 
Figure 5.9- Vulnerability levels of a partially collapsed DMZ with virtual separation of trust 
zones detected by Nmap. All parameters that were detected correctly are given as red bars in 
the diagram. Nmap suggested the existence of a firewall (yellow), but failed to detect the MAC 
address of the server (green).  
5.1.2.5 Nessus Vulnerability Scanner 
The route detected by Nessus was 203.168.1.50 to 203.1.254 to “?” to 192.168.7.115 
(see Table 5.11). It also detected a firewall that prevents direct connections to the 
server. It detected that the Microsoft HTTP service was enabled on the server, but 
failed to detect the version of the HTTP. Nessus also failed to detect any DNS service 
available on the server.  
However, the scanner successfully detected TCP port 80 and UDP port 53 as the 
opened ports on the server. Furthermore, it detected 192.168.7.115 as the IP address 
for the target machine.  Like other scanning tools, Nessus was not able to detect the 
MAC address of the server. In addition, it failed to detect the OS type of the server 
and the correct hostname.  
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Table 5.11- Comparison of server configuration setup values and values detected by the Nessus 
Vulnerability Scanner for DMZ Design 2.  
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values Nessus  Detected 
Setup Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 53 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Not Detected 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  Not Detected 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Suggests 
Microsoft Http 
service, no version 
 Not Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 203.168.1.50 
 203.168.1.254 
 ? 
 192.168.7.115 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Detected (linux) 
 
Nessus suggested that the MAC address parameter was the least vulnerable feature, 
as it was not able to detect any MAC address (Figure 5.10); therefore, a level 1 was 
allocated as the level of vulnerability for this parameter. On the other hand, level 4 
was assigned to the open ports parameter, as Nessus detected both open ports.  
The second most vulnerable parameter after the open ports was the firewall detection 
parameter, as the tool depicted a Linux firewall in place, determining a level of 3 as 
the level of vulnerability for this parameter.  Level 2.9 and 2.8 were determined asthe 
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level of vulnerability of the route and the OS fingerprint parameter, respectively; 
suggesting the parameters as moderately vulnerable to exploits.   
The Services parameter was allocated a value of 2, because Nessus just detected the 
HTTP service without its version and in addition failed to detect any DNS service. 
 
Figure 5.10- Vulnerability levels of a partially collapsed DMZ with virtual separation of trust 
zones detected by the Nessus Vulnerability Scanner. The open ports showed a vulnerability level 
of 4 (red). The OS Finger Prints, the routes to the server and the firewall detection showed an 
intermediate level of vulnerability (yellow). The MAC address was not detected by Nessus and 
the services parameter was detected inaccurately (green).  
5.1.3 Design 3 - Fully Collapsed DMZ 
In the following sections the vulnerability scan data for DMZ Design 3, generated by 
X-Scan, the Shadow Security Scanner, GFI LANguard, Network Mapper and the 
Nessus Vulnerability Scanner will be discussed. The results given by each 
vulnerability assessment tool will be discussed in detail concerning the numeric 
value assigned to each parameter on a scale from 1 to 4.  
5.1.3.1 X-Scan  
The results generated by X-Scan suggested TCP port 80 as the only open port on the 
target machine (see Table 5.12). It failed to detect UDP port 53 as the other open port 
on the server. X-Scan detected 192.168.7.115 as the IP address of the server and 
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Windows NT as the OS type. But it was unable to detect the host name and the 
version of the operating system. 
X-Scan detected the correct version of the HTTP service running on the server, but 
did not suggest the existence of any DNS service. It was also unsuccessful in 
detecting the MAC address and the existence of any firewall.  
The route suggested by X-Scan to the server was “203.168.1.254 to 192.16810.253 
to 192.168.7.115”, in comparison to the correct route of “203.168.1.254 to 
192.168.8.253 to 192.168.7.254 to 192.168.7.115”. 
Table 5.12 - Comparison of server configuration values of DMZ Design 3 and values detected by 
X-Scan. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values X-Scan  Detected 
Setup Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 Not Detected 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Windows NT x.x 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  Not Detected 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Detected 
 Not Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 
 203.168.1.254 
 192.168.10.253 
 192.168.7.115 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Not Detected 
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From the results in Table 5.12, Figure 5.11was designed to depict the level of 
vulnerability for each parameter. The most vulnerable parameter in this case was the 
route parameter with 3.2 being the level of vulnerability.  
The open ports, OS fingerprint and services parameters are the second most 
vulnerable parameters detected by X-Scan, with each suggesting 2.5 as the level of 
vulnerability. The reason for this is that all three parameters were inaccurately and/or 
incompletely detected by X-Scan. X-Scan was not able to detect any physical address 
of the server and detected no firewall filtering the traffic to the target machine. 
Therefore, the level of vulnerability these parameters was 1. 
 
Figure 5.11- Vulnerability levels of a fully collapsed DMZ detected by X-Scan. The route to the 
server was the most vulnerable parameter (red). The open ports, OS finger prints and services 
were inaccurately or incompletely detected by X-Scan (yellow) and the MAC address and the 
firewall were not detected at all (green).  
5.1.3.2 Shadow Security Scanner 
SSS successful detected TCP port 80 and UDP port 53 as the two open ports on the 
target server (see Table 5.13). The scan tool was not able to detect any route to the 
target server and it failed to determine the MAC address of the server. It was also 
unsuccessful in determining the placement of any dedicated firewall.  
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While scanning for the operating system fingerprint, X-Scan was just able to detect 
192.168.7.115 as the IP address of the server, but it failed to determine the correct 
hostname and the type of OS. In addition, X-Scan was not able to detect any route to 
the server.  
However, X-Scan successfully detected Microsoft IIS as the HTTP service and 
Windows server 2003/2008 as the DNS service on the server, but failed to determine 
the correct version of the respective services.  
Table 5.13- Comparison of server configuration setup values for DMZ Design 3 and values 
detected by SSS. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values SSS Detected Setup 
Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 53 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Not Detected 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  Not Detected 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Microsoft IIS 
 Windows 
2000/2003 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 Not Detected 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Not Detected 
 
In the following bar chart (see Figure 5.12), the open ports parameter represents the 
most vulnerable feature detected by the Shadow Security Scanner. It was assigned a 
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value of 4, since both open ports were detected by the scan tool. The OS fingerprint 
was the second most vulnerable parameter with 2.7 as vulnerability level, followed 
by the services parameter with a value of 2.5 on the scale.  
However, SSS was unable to detect the route, MAC address and firewall protecting 
the server. Therefore, the route, the MAC address and the firewall detection were the 
least vulnerable parameters with 1beingtheir level of vulnerability. 
 
Figure 5.12- Vulnerability levels of a fully collapsed DMZ detected by SSS. Both open ports 
were detected (red). The OS finger prints and the services showed an intermediate level of 
vulnerability (yellow) and the MAC address, the route and the firewall were not detected at all 
(green). 
5.1.3.3 GFI LANguard 
GFI LANguard successfully suggested port 80 as the open TCP port on the server 
(Table 5.14). On the other hand, it failed to detect UDP port 53, for DNS service, as 
the other open port on the server. Just like all the other scan tools it was successful in 
determining 192.168.7.115 as the IP address.   
It suggested the target machine was two hops away from the source of GFI’s scan 
position outside the network. GFI failed to suggest any DNS service running on the 
server but was successful in determining “httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp)” as the 
correct version of HTTP service on the server.    
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GFI was also unsuccessful in identifying the hostname, OS type and a firewall 
blocking traffic to the server. GFIsuggested “00-02-17-63-0A-14” as the MAC 
address of the target machine instead of “00-0c-29-88-0e-48” 
The results generated by GFI were used to design Figure 5.13. The diagram depicts the 
level of vulnerability for each parameter. 
Table 5.14 - Comparison of server configuration setup values of DMZ Design 3 and values 
detected by GFI LANanguard. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values GFI LANguard 
Detected Setup 
Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 Not Detected 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Windows (no 
version) 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  00-02-17-63-0A-
14 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Detected 
 Not Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 2 hops away 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Not detected 
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In Figure 5.13, it can be seen that the firewall detection parameter is the least 
vulnerable parameter with a value of 1, as GFI was not able to generate any data for 
this parameter.  
The MAC addresses and route parameter were the second lowest vulnerable 
parameters detected by GFI. The level of vulnerability for both parameters was 1.8.  
The most vulnerable parameters (OS fingerprints and services) detected by GFI 
never exceeded a value of 2.5. 
 
Figure 5.13- Vulnerability levels of a fully collapsed DMZ detected by GFI LANguard. The 
firewall, routes to the serve and MAC address were the least vulnerable parameters detected 
(green). The open ports, OS finger prints and services showed an intermediate level of 
vulnerability (yellow), but never exceeded a value of 2.5. 
5.1.3.4 Nmap 
Nmap detected a firewall blocking traffic to the target server (see Table 5.15). It also 
detected TCP port 80 and UDP port 53 as the open ports on the server. Nmap 
successfully detected 192.168.7.115 as the IP address and Windows server 2008 as 
the operating system of the server. But it was not able to determine the correct 
hostname of the server. Nmap was also not successful in determining the MAC 
address of the server.  
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However, Nmap successfully determined the enabled services and the service 
version. It detected “httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp)” and “Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001” 
as the HTTP and DNS services running on the server, respectively. 
Table 5.15- Comparison of server configuration setup values of DMZ Design 3 and values 
detected by Nmap. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values Nmap Detected Setup 
Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 53 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Windows Server 
2008 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  Not Detected 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Detected 
 Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 203.168.1254 
 192.168.10.253 
 192.168.7.115 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Firewall Detected 
Figure 5.14 shows that the open ports and services parameters as the most vulnerable 
parameters. Their level of vulnerability is set at 4.  Nmap identified the correct IP 
address and operating system fingerprint, giving these parameters a vulnerability 
level of 3.7.According to Figure 5.14, the route is the third most vulnerable parameter 
with a value of 3.2, followed by the firewall detection parameter with a value of 
3.The vulnerability level of the MAC address parameter is 1, suggesting it as the 
least vulnerable parameter. 
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Figure 5.14- Vulnerability levels of a fully collapsed DMZ detected by Nmap. The open ports 
and services were the most vulnerable parameters detected by Nmap, followed by the OS 
fingerprint and the services parameter (red). Nmap detected a firewall (yellow), but could not 
detect the correct MAC address (green). 
5.1.3.5 Nessus Vulnerability Scanner 
The Nessus Vulnerability Scanner successfully detected Windows server 2008 as the 
OS type and 192.168.7.115 as the IP address, but (see Table 5.16) the tool was 
unsuccessful in determining “rspsweb01.rsps.net” as the hostname. Instead it 
suggested “rspstest.com” as the hostname.   
Nessus detected port 80 and port 53 as the correct TCP and UDP open ports on the 
server. But the scan tool failed to detect the MAC address of the server and was not 
able to determine any DNS service running on the server. However, Nessus detected 
“httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp)” as the correct version of HTTP running on the 
server.  
The route suggested by Nessus was not correct.  It identified the source of the scan, 
the default gateway from the scan and the target machine. It failed to suggest the 
routes from the default gateway.  The route result generated by Nessus was 
203.168.1.50 to 203.168.1.254 to “?” to 192.168.7.115.  
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Table 5.16- Comparison of server configuration setup values and values determined by the 
Nessus Vulnerability Scanner for DMZ Design 3. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values Nessus  Detected 
Setup Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 53 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Windows Server 
2008 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  Not Detected 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Detected 
 Not Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 
 203.168.1.50 
 203.168.1.254 
 ? 
 192.168.7.115 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Firewall Detected  
 
In Figure 5.15the open ports parameter is depicted as the most vulnerable parameter 
with a level of vulnerability as high as 4. The MAC address parameter had a value of 
1, making it the least vulnerable parameter amongst the six classified parameters. 
The OS fingerprint was the second most vulnerable parameter with a value of 3.6, 
because Nessus detected the correct IP address and the operating system of the target 
server. The third most vulnerable parameter detected by Nessus was the route 
parameter; this was followed by the firewall detection and services parameter with a 
value of 3 and 2.5, respectively.  
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Figure 5.15- Vulnerability levels of a fully collapsed DMZ detected by the Nessus Vulnerability 
Scanner. The open ports, OS finger print and routes parameters were the most vulnerable (red). 
The services and the firewall detection showed an intermediate level of vulnerability (yellow) 
and the MAC address of the server could not be detected by Nessus (green).  
5.1.4 Design 4 – Traditional Physical DMZ 
In the following sections the vulnerability scan data for DMZ Design 4, generated by 
X-Scan, the Shadow Security Scanner, GFI LANguard, Network Mapper and the 
Nessus Vulnerability Scanner will be discussed. The results given by each 
vulnerability assessment tool will be discussed in detail concerning the numeric 
value assigned to each parameter on a scale from 1 to 4. 
5.1.4.1 X-Scan  
In Table 5.17 the scan results generated by X-Scan for DMZ Design 4 can be seen. 
The tool suggests two open pots on the server. The open ports are TCP port 80 and 
UDP port 53. X-Scan detected Windows NT as the operating system type and 
192.168.7.115 as the IP address of the server.  
The route suggested by X-Scan was only partially correct: the suggested rout was 
203.168.1.254 to 192.168.10.253 to 192.168.7.115. X-Scan also incorrectly 
suggested “rspstest.com” as the hostname (OS fingerprint section of Table 5.17) 
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The tool failed to detect the MAC address of the server to suggest any firewalls 
protecting the server. Although the HTTP service was correctly identified as 
“httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp)”, X-Scan failed to determine the DNS service 
running on the server.  
Table 5.17- Comparison of server configuration setup values and values detected by X-Scan for 
DMZ Design 4. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values X-Scan Detected 
Setup Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 53 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Windows NT x.x 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  
 Not Detected 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Detected 
 Not Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 203.168.1.254 
 192.168.10.253 
 192.168.7.115 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Not Detected 
The open ports parameter was the most vulnerable parameter detected by X-Scan, as 
shown in Figure 5.16. The level of vulnerability for open ports was 4. The OS 
fingerprint and route parameters were the second most vulnerable parameters; both 
of them exhibited vulnerability level of 3.2.  
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Since one service was detected correctly and the other was left undetected, the level 
of vulnerability for the services parameter was determined to be 2.5.  In addition, the 
level of vulnerability for the MAC address and the firewall detection parameter was 
minimal, with a value of 1, because X-Scan was not able to determine the MAC 
address and any firewall protecting the server at all.  
 
Figure 5.16- Vulnerability levels of a traditional physical DMZ detected by X-Scan. The open 
ports and the routes parameter were the most vulnerable (red). The OS fingerprint and the 
services were partially detected by the tool (yellow). The MAC address and a firewall protecting 
the server could not be detected at all (green).  
5.1.4.2 Shadow Security Scanner 
The Shadow Security Scanner successfully detected both TCP port 80 and UDP port 
53 as the two open ports on the server (see Table 5.18). As seen in the OS fingerprint 
section, it successfully detected IP 192.168.7.115 as the correct IP address, but failed 
to determine “rspsweb01.rsps.net” as the hostname and generated no result for the 
type of operating system at all.  
SSS determined that both HTTP and DNS services running on the server were 
Microsoft- based, but could not determine the exact version of the services. In terms 
of detecting the route to the server, the MAC address and the existence of a firewall 
filtering traffic to the server, SSS was unsuccessful. 
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Table 5.18- Comparison of server configuration setup values and values detected by SSS for 
DMZ Design 4. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values SSS Detected Setup 
Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 53 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Not Detected 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  Not Detected 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Microsoft IIS 
 Windows 
2000/2003 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 Not Detected 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Not Detected 
 
Figure 5.17 depicts open ports parameter as the most vulnerable parameter with a 
value of 4, as SSS was successful in detecting both open ports on the server. Just like 
in all the other DMZ designs the MAC address, the route and the firewall detection 
parameters were the least vulnerable ones with a value of 1.   
The services parameter was the second most vulnerable feature of the target, 
followed by the OS fingerprint parameter with a value of 2.9 and 2.8, respectively. 
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Figure 5.17- Vulnerability levels of a traditional physical DMZ detected by SSS. Both open ports 
were detected by the tool (red), while the MAC address, the route and the firewall were not 
detected at all (green). The OS fingerprint and the services showed an intermediate level of 
vulnerability (yellow).  
5.1.4.3 GFI LANguard 
GFI LANguard successfully determined 192.168.7.115 as the IP address of the 
server (see Table 5.19). GFI successfully determined port 80 as the open TCP port on 
the server, while it failed to suggest UDP port 53 as the other open port on the server. 
The MAC address detected by GFI was “00-02-17-63-0A-14”, that was equally 
incorrect.  
The route to the target machine suggested by GFI was two hops away from the 
source of the scan while it should be 3 hops away in reality. GFI was successful in 
suggesting “httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp)” as the version of HTTP service running 
on the server. On the contrary, it failed to determine any DNS service running on the 
target machine.  The hostname suggested by GFI was “rspstest.com” which was also 
incorrect. GFI suggested the Windows as the OS type, but was unable to determine 
what version of Windows was running on the server. It also failed to produce any 
results that would suggest the existence of a firewall blocking traffic to the server.  
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Table 5.19- Comparison of server configuration setup values and values detected by GFI 
LANguard for DMZ Design 4. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values GFI LANguard 
Detected Setup 
Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Windows  
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  00-02-17-63-0A-
14 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Detected 
 Not Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 2 hops away 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Not Detected 
 
As seen in the previous designs, GFI suggests minimal exposure to vulnerabilities 
found in the target machine (see Figure 5.18). The most vulnerable parameters were 
the open ports, the OS fingerprint and the services. Each parameter had a value of 
2.5, which is a moderate level of vulnerability.    
The firewall detection parameter had a value of 1, making it the least vulnerable 
parameter amongst the other six parameters. Since GFI merely suggested the number 
of hops for the route to the target machine, the level of vulnerability for route 
parameter was determined as 1.8. The MAC address parameter also had a value of 
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1.8, as GFI only detected the MAC address of the gateway, but not the MAC for the 
target machine. 
 
Figure 5.18- Vulnerability levels of a traditional physical DMZ detected by GFILANguard. The 
open ports, OS fingerprint and services parameter showed a moderate level of vulnerability 
(yellow) while the MAC address, the route and the firewall detection parameter were less 
vulnerable (green).  
5.1.4.4 Nmap 
Nmap detected port 80 and 53 as the open TCP and UDP ports, respectively (see 
Table 5.20). Nmap was very accurate in determining 192.168.7.115 as the IP address 
and Windows Server 2008 as the operating system of the target machine. However, 
just like all the other tools it failed to determine “rsspweb01.rsps.net” as the 
hostname of the server. 
Nmap was successful in determining the correct HTTP and DNS services running on 
the server. It successfully detected “httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp)” as the HTTP 
service and “Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001” as the DNS service.   
Furthermore, Nmap suggested the existence of a firewall protecting the server. The 
only parameter for which Nmap was not able to produce any results was the MAC 
address. Nmap detected no MAC address for the server during all the five scan runs 
conducted for Design 4. 
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Table 5.20- Comparison of server configuration setup values and values detected by Nmap for 
DMZ Design 4. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values Nmap Detected Setup 
Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 53 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Windows Server 
2008 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  Not Detected 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Detected 
 Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 203.168.1.254 
 192.168.10.253 
 192.168.7.115 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Firewall Detected  
 
From the results of the vulnerability scan (see Table 5.20), a bar diagram depicting 
the level of vulnerability for each parameter was generated (Figure 5.19). Nmap 
detected open ports OS fingerprints, services and the route parameter, making them 
highly vulnerable parameters. The level of vulnerability for each parameter was 
determined as 4, 3.8, 4 and 3.1, respectively. 
As Nmap was not able to detect any MAC address for the target machine, the MAC 
address parameter was the least vulnerable parameter with value of 1. Unlike other 
tools, Nmap detected a Linux firewall. Therefore, the level of vulnerability for the 
firewall detection parameter was 3. 
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Figure 5.19- Vulnerability levels of a traditional physical DMZ detected by Nmap. Both open 
ports, OS finger prints, services and routes were detected by Nmap (red). The tool also 
suggested a Linux-based firewall protecting the server (yellow). However, no MAC address 
could be determined (green). 
5.1.4.5 Nessus Vulnerability Scanner 
Nessus successfully detected TCP port 80 and UDP port 53 as the open ports on the 
server (see Table 5.21). For the OS fingerprint parameter, Nessus detected 
192.168.7.115 as the IP address for the target machine. It failed to detect the OS type 
of the server and incorrectly suggested “rspstest.com” as the hostname of the server.  
The route detected by Nessus was 203.168.1.50 to 203.1.254 to “?” to 192.168.7.115. 
Nessus also detected a firewall, filtering traffic before it could reach the server. It 
detected that the Microsoft HTTP service was enabled on the server. However, the 
HTTP version could not be determined. The DNS service and the MAC address of 
the server could not be detected.  
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Table 5.21- Comparison of server configuration setup values and values detected by the Nessus 
Vulnerability Scanner for DMZ Design 4. 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration Setup Values Nessus  Detected 
Values 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
 80 
 53 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspstest.com 
 Not Detected 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  Not Detected 
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 (SSDp/Upnp) 
 
 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 Suggests 
Microsoft Http 
service, no version 
 Not Detected 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 203.168.1.50 
 203.168.1.254 
 ? 
 192.168.7.115 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  Firewall Detected 
As shown in Figure 5.20, the open ports parameter, with a value of level 4, was the 
most vulnerable feature in this design. The MAC address could not be determined, 
therefore making it the least vulnerable parameters. Just like Nmap, Nessus picked 
up a Linux firewall, filtering traffic to the target server. Therefore, the level of 
vulnerability determined for this parameter was 3. The route parameter, with a 
vulnerability level of 2.9, was the third most vulnerable parameter in DMZ Design 4. 
The OS fingerprint was the fourth most vulnerable parameter with a value of 2.8. 
Since Nessus could only suggest the HTTP service running on the server without any 
suggestion for the version of the HTTP service, the level of vulnerability for the 
services parameter was as low as 2.  
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Figure 5.20- Vulnerability levels of a traditional physical DMZ detected by the Nessus 
Vulnerability Scanner. The open ports detected by Nessus were the most vulnerable parameter 
(red). The firewall, route and OS fingerprint parameter showed an intermediate level of 
vulnerability (yellow). As the services were only incompletely detected and the MAC address 
could not be determined at all, these parameters were the least vulnerable (green). 
5.2 DMZ Design-Based Data Analysis 
From the data that was collected throughout this study (see Section 0), percentage 
evaluation charts for each individual DMZ design were created.  The figures describe 
each vulnerability parameter and the level of accuracy of detection by vulnerability 
assessment tools, i.e. the success rate of identifying correct information in 
percentage.  This means, the more vulnerabilities were detected, the higher the 
percentage of vulnerability for this parameter will be and the more likely the 
parameter is to be exploited by malicious users.  In this section these evaluation 
charts will be discussed in detail. 
5.2.1 Design 1 - Partially Collapsed DMZ with physical trust zones 
In Figure 5.21, the percentage of vulnerability for a partially collapsed DMZ, where 
the trust zones are separated with the help of traditional hardware firewalls, is 
depicted along the Y-axis. The overall vulnerability for each individual vulnerability 
parameter was calculated using the data from all vulnerability assessment tools for 
each virtual DMZ designs. 
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In Figure 5.21 we can see that the open ports parameter is the biggest security risk 
within Design 1. The calculated percentage of vulnerability of all tools was as high 
as 88% for the open ports parameter. 
The percentage of vulnerability detected for the route, services and OS fingerprint 
parameter was analysed and calculated to be 74%, 70% and 69%, respectively. 
Although these are not as high as the open ports parameter, taken together they can 
still provide sufficient information to launch an attack. In Section 0 we saw that none 
of the scanning tools could identify the correct firewall, but some tools suggested 
that there was a Linux firewall protecting the target server. Thus, the firewall 
parameter had an overall vulnerability of 45%. 
The percentage of vulnerability for the MAC address parameter was calculated to 
be29%, since none of the tools could provide sufficient information regarding the 
MAC address.  
 
Figure 5.21- Vulnerability detection of each individual vulnerability parameter in a partially 
collapsed DMS with physical trust zone 
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5.2.2 Design 2 - Partially Collapsed DMZ with virtual separation of trust 
zones 
In Figure 5.22 we can clearly see that the open ports parameter with 85% 
vulnerability is the easiest parameter to exploit when wanting to hack a server. The 
OS fingerprint parameter was the second most vulnerable; with 75% as the level of 
vulnerability and the third highest vulnerable parameter was the services parameter 
with 70% vulnerability. 
The level of vulnerability detection for the route parameter was 15%, as compared to 
74% in Design 1.  However, the vulnerability detection of firewalls in Design 2 was 
50%, which is an increase of 5% compared to Design 1.The scan tools were accurate 
in 29% of cases in extracting information of the MAC address.  
 
Figure 5.22-Vulnerability detection of each individual vulnerability parameter in a partially 
collapsed DMS with virtual trust zone 
5.2.3 Design 3 - Fully Collapsed DMZ 
In a fully collapsed DMZ design, scans tools extracted information about open ports 
with an accuracy of 85% (see Figure 5.23). Again, like in all the other DMZ designs, 
this was the most vulnerable parameter. MAC address information produced by the 
tools had an accuracy of 29%. The scan tools produced an accuracy level of 75%for 
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the OS fingerprint parameter. This was followed by the services and routes parameter 
with a vulnerability detection of 69% and 62%, respectively.  
 
Figure 5.23- Vulnerability detection of each individual vulnerability parameter in a fully 
collapsed DMZ 
5.2.4 Design 4 – Traditional Physical DMZ 
As we move to the traditional DMZ design, we can see that the vulnerability 
detection for open ports was as high as 93% (see Figure 5.24). Second most accurately 
detected parameter was the OS fingerprint with a vulnerability detection of 74%. The 
services parameter was the third most accurate detected parameter with an accuracy 
of 70%. The scan tools produced unchanged information with an accuracy of 29% in 
detecting the MAC address, just like in all the other DMZ designs.  The scanning 
tools produced accurate results for the route parameter in 60% of cases and in 45% 
for the firewall detection parameter. .  
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Figure 5.24- Vulnerability detection of each individual vulnerability parameter within a 
traditional physical DMZ 
5.3 Summary 
This chapter discusses the vulnerabilities deteced by the five scanning tools on each 
DMZ design. The results generated by the tools were matched against the actual 
configuration settings of the target machine. Based on the accuracy of the result, the 
collected data helepd the author depict level of vulnerability for each design with the 
help of histograms.  
In the next chapter the author holds a discussion abou the impact of the vulnerabiities 
found by the scanning tools as seen in this chapter on the each DMZ design.    
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6 Discussion & Conclusion 
The aim of this research was to determine which virtual DMZ design would be the 
most robust to use for systems and network engineers. From the results of 
experiments conducted, the author discusses the findings and describes factors that 
could affect the choice of a particular DMZ design. The findings help the author to 
determine a suitable virtual DMZ design, which would also leverage systems and 
network engineers to deploy a suitable virtual DMZ in their environment. Based on 
the data analysis conducted in the previous chapter, as depicted in Figure 6.1, there is 
only a difference of 1% vulnerability risk factor between all four DMZ designs.  
 
Figure 6.1 – Overall Vulnerability Risk Factor across different DMZ designs. 
The overall risk factor for Design 1 and 4 was calculated to be 62%, as compared to 
61% for Design 2 and Design 3. While Design 1 is the partially collapsed DMZ with 
physical trust zone, Design 2 is the partially collapsed DMZ with virtual separation 
of trust zones, Design 3 is the fully collapsed DMZ and Design 4 represents the 
traditional DMZ. In the next section of this chapter the results of this research will be 
discussed. The details of the four designs have been covered earlier in Chapter 4 
Section 4.3.  
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6.1 Key Findings of the Research 
In this section, the author has summarized the key findings for each virtual DMZ 
design. These key findings were analysed with the primary research question “Is it 
secure to implement DMZ in a virtual network infrastructure?” Discussions in sub 
sections below address the primary research question in regard to each virtual DMZ 
design in more detail.  
6.1.1 Design 1 - Partially Collapsed DMZ with Physical Trust Zones 
The design of a partially collapsed DMZ involved separation of trust zones with the 
help of two physical firewalls, see Figure 4.5. As opposed to a traditional design the 
only difference of this design is that instead of deploying physical servers for each 
available service in the DMZ, the design leverages the benefits of virtualization. 
Engineers deploy virtual machines for hosting publically available services like web 
servers, mail servers and FTP servers in the DMZs. These virtual machines and their 
hosts are separated into different security trust zones using physical firewalls. These 
firewalls are configured in a way we would normally configure egress and ingress 
traffic to permit, discard or block TCP/IP services within the DMZ or the network. 
Necessary ports are opened in the firewalls and are mapped to a specific IP address 
to allow access to the services mentioned above. The security in this design is 
determined by the level of protection and the inspection algorithms on the firewalls 
themselves. Virtualization in this case is a technology that empowers the systems and 
network engineers to utilize their available hardware resources efficiently. Therefore, 
while it is secure to deploy a partially collapsed DMZ with physical trust zones, it is 
not as secure as Design 2 and Design 3 discussed below. 
6.1.2 Design 2 - Partially Collapsed DMZ with Virtual Separation of Trust 
Zones 
Like in Design 1, a partially collapsed DMZ with virtual separation of trust zones the 
DMZ trust zones are separated with the help of physical firewalls. The difference 
between Design 1 and Design 2 is that the virtual machines are deployed on single 
host and are separated with the help of virtual switches within the hypervisor, see 
Figure 4.6. Similar to Design 1 the firewalls in Design 2 are also configured to 
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analyse egress and ingress traffic. Moreover, port- based firewall filters are applied. 
Besides paying attention to the appropriate firewall configuration, thought has to be 
given to deploying virtual machines as well. It is very easy for an engineer to connect 
a virtual machine belonging to a high security trust zone to a virtual switch with low 
security level. Apart from that, the security of the DMZ is determined by the access 
policies on the physical firewalls. 
6.1.3 Design 3 - Fully Collapsed DMZ 
Unlike Design 1 and Design 2, herein a totally different approach to deploying a 
fully collapsed DMZ has to be made. The basic fundamentals of securing the DMZ 
remain the same. Only the approach to deploying the DMZ is different, since it 
leverages virtualization as a deployment technology. In this design, like in the 
previous designs, services in the DMZ are set up on virtual machines. Design 3 
utilizes one single VMware ESXi host to roll out virtual machines. Along with that, 
even the firewalls are implemented as virtual appliances, as shown in Figure 4.6. 
These virtual firewall appliances run on the same operating system as the traditional 
firewalls would. For example, if an organization has a checkpoint or juniper firewall 
hardware appliance, they can adopt virtualization and get the same firewalling 
capabilities as the same product using virtualization. The only difference here is that 
instead of using physical hardware to run the firewall OS, they can use virtually 
emulated hardware to run the firewall OS. You can attain the same level of security 
as you would get using Design1 and Design 2, or even using the traditional DMZ 
design. However, designing a fully collapsed DMZ is much more complex than any 
other design. One single configuration error can jeopardize the security of the whole 
infrastructure.   
The discussion above explains that it is secure to implement DMZs within the virtual 
network infrastructure. Based on the data analysis in Chapter 5 and the subsequent 
discussion held earlier in this chapter, the author is also able to answer secondary 
research questions. These questions are discussed below.  
6.1.4 Which is the most secure type of virtual DMZ? 
Based on the results depicted by the experiments conducted in this research, 
generally all three virtual DMZ designs were equally secure. The difference lies in 
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the implementation of each DMZ design. This includes the way security policies are 
implemented and the choice of firewall vendors that is reflected in the quality of their 
filtering mechanisms.  
6.1.5 Which DMZ design is appropriate for a specific business 
requirement? 
For a business, the choice of deploying a virtual DMZ depends upon how much they 
are willing to invest in the solution, including educating their staff to support the 
chosen solution. In general, for SMEs a fully collapsed DMZ is favourable.  
Although the implementations are complicated, once the DMZs are deployed, they 
can save huge operational cost (less hardware resources and electrical consumption). 
For a SME or a large enterprise, a partially collapsed DMZ with virtual or physical 
separation of trust zones would be the appropriate choice. This would enable them to 
utilize the full capacity of their operational staff by looking after each individual 
module of virtual DMZ solution. Meaning, the security team can focus on the 
firewall configuration in virtual DMZs and the systems team can maintain the servers 
in the virtual DMZ.  
6.1.6 What impact will virtual DMZs have on information security in 
contrast to traditional DMZs? 
As shown in Figure 6.1 the risk factor of all three DMZ designs is almost equivalent 
to the risk factor of traditional DMZs. This implies that virtual DMZs are as robust or 
as weak as traditional DMZs. The same level of security is maintained when using 
virtual DMZs as compared to traditional DMZs. The implementation of a DMZ 
design depends greatly on how much money an organization is willing to invest in 
designing and implementing a virtual solution. The initial cost for implementing a 
fully virtualized solution can be more expensive since virtualization as a technology 
is not cheap. Once implemented, organisations can save huge costs, as the overhead 
management (IT staff) of a virtual infrastructure is less than the one with a physical 
infrastructure. Virtualized DMZ requires less hardware resources, therefore in terms 
of electrical consumption, it is a cost efficient solution.. 
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The benefits are not noticed during the implementation process, but are seen after a 
year of implementation, as both capital and operational cost for maintaining a virtual 
DMZ solution are greatly reduced. Where the organizations have short term cost 
savings strategy then they might not decide to go with a fully virtualized DMZ 
solution, however if they are looking to save cost over longer time periods say after 2 
years and so on then virtual DMZ can definitely help achieve these goals. 
6.1.7 What is to be avoided while deploying VMs in a DMZ? 
While deploying virtual DMZs, engineers should pay extra attention not to deploy a 
virtual machine that belongs to a trust zone with high security level in a trust zone 
with low security level. This configuration change can easily be made with few 
mouse clicks. Also, while configuring a virtual DMZ, as depicted in Design 2 and 
Design 3, where all the virtual machines are deployed on a single host machine, the 
engineers should be very careful not to deploy the virtual machines from different 
trust zones on the same virtual switch within the ESXi. This would be equal to 
connecting a NIC of a server to a wrong VLAN. 
In this section, the discussion covered the key findings relating to the primary and 
secondary research questions. In the next section the author elaborates on other 
findings during the course of this research. These finding can be viewed as 
considerations for design rather than results, which the author deems necessary when 
deploying a virtual DMZ.  
6.2 Recommendations for Deploying Virtual DMZs 
Deploying virtual machines eliminates the need of procuring hardware resources for 
servers. This means new systems can be introduced more quickly and easily into the 
network. It is also a very flexible technology for deploying machines across different 
security zones within an organization that requires different levels of trust for 
services within the virtual machines. A wrong design choice, configuration, or 
implementation can severely jeopardize an organization’s information security. 
Based on the author’s findings while conducting his research, recommendations are 
given in the following sections. 
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These recommendations can be very useful for engineers, helping them to securely 
deploy virtual DMZs, or even implementing virtual infrastructures in their intranet or 
extranet environment. Some of the recommendations given by the author are 
discussed below.  
6.2.1 Physical Networking Recommendations 
When deploying virtual network infrastructures in an existing network, it is 
necessary to consider how the host machines are connected to the existing physical 
network. Typically these hosts are to be connected to the physical switches just like 
any other physical server. But since virtual switches within the hypervisor are similar 
to physical switches in the traffic handling mechanism, they can easily initiate STP 
(spanning tree protocol) elections on the physical switches and cause topology 
changes. This may cause loss of network connectivity to the end user. Therefore the 
switch ports on physical switches, where these hosts are connected, should be 
configured as access/edge ports. It is important to consider the design of VLANs 
before the introduction of a virtual infrastructure to an existing network, because 
virtual infrastructures cater to production networks, test networks, development 
networks as well as DMZ networks.  
6.2.2 Virtual Networking Recommendations 
Most hypervisors (like VMware's ESXi) have the ability to create virtual switches 
whose logical behaviour is similar to traditional physical switches. These virtual 
switches, like physical switches, also understand the logic of VLANs. While 
designing virtual switches and VLANs misconfigurations can easily lead to security 
risks. The promiscuous mode on virtual switches should be disabled; this would 
prevent rogue virtual machines from sniffing any unwanted traffic.  
NIC teaming should be enabled only if more than two NICs are connected to a 
virtual switch for redundant failover environment. While designing VLANs in virtual 
switches, only VLANs required by guest machines connected to a virtual switch 
should be created. When configuring DMZs within ESXi, extra attention should be 
paid to link the correct virtual NIC of a virtual machine to the correct DMZ trust 
zone. Also, it is a good practice to keep SAN traffic on a separate backbone, so that 
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the storage traffic to the hypervisors and virtual machines does not interfere with 
production traffic. 
6.2.3 Administration Access Control for the virtual environment 
Often Systems and network administrators have full access to each and every entity 
of the virtual infrastructure (Owens, 2009). Access control should be applied to a 
group of individuals based on their administrative roles within the virtual 
infrastructure. Network engineers should only have access to the virtual network that 
includes virtual switches, virtual NICs and host network adaptors. Systems engineers 
should have access to system management capabilities like server deployment, 
management of updates and hotfixes. Storage engineers should only have access to 
storage adaptors for presenting storage data stores to these flexible virtual networks. 
Similarly, database administrators should only be able to log into database systems, 
mail server administrators should have administrative rights for mail server systems.  
This control of access to different entities in virtual network administration can be 
integrated and managed with LDAP technologies such as active directory. In 
addition, there are access control groups within VMware ESXi that allow access to 
different elements of virtual infrastructures based on group memberships. 
 Moreover, staffs that manage the entire virtual network infrastructure should be 
trained on a regular basis to avoid unplanned changes to the infrastructure. 
6.2.4 Firewall and Antivirus Strategies 
Setting up firewalls and antivirus can be tricky within virtual network infrastructures. 
In Section 4.3 of Chapter 4 the author has explained how firewalls can be deployed 
to protect the production and perimeter networks. In addition, deploying antivirus 
solution in a virtual environment can enhance the security of the infrastructure. 
Antivirus programs can be implemented either in-band or out-of-band.  
In-Band Antivirus–The in-band antivirus deployment technique is the traditional 
antivirus deployment technique. The architecture consists of a central antivirus 
server, which interacts with antivirus agents on client machines. The central antivirus 
server initiates scans on each client and updates their security policies on a regular 
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basis. Symantec Endpoint security solution is a perfect example of in-band antivirus 
security solution.  
Out-Of Band - This antivirus solution is basically an agentless antivirus solution 
that scans the traffic and file system of a virtual machine at hypervisor level. All the 
traffic that is passed to the virtual machines is also analysed by the antivirus, similar 
to an intrusion detection and prevention system (Dennis technology, 2011). Trend 
Micro’s Deep Security and MacAfee Move are examples of out-of-band antivirus 
solutions. 
Based on the scalability of virtual infrastructures and the knowledge of engineering 
staff to manage antivirus definitions, desired antivirus solutions can be deployed 
across virtual network infrastructures. 
Compared to physical infrastructures, antivirus solutions in virtual infrastructures 
have to be VDI (virtual desktops) and virtual servers aware. An independent research 
conduct by Dennis Technology Labs tested Symantec's Endpoint protection, 
McAfee's move and TrendMicro's Office Scan products for a virtual infrastructure 
aware solution. In their reports they mentioned that all three products are virtual 
infrastructure aware.  
The architecture for deploying antivirus in virtual infrastructures is similar to the way 
antivirus solutions are deployed in physical infrastructures. Client-server model is 
still adopted by antivirus solution providers where there is a centralized server that 
updates security definitions on individual clients. These individual clients are 
antivirus agents that run as a services on the machine and update. Implementing the 
antivirus agent is the only difference that virtual infrastructures have as opposed to 
physical infrastructures. Sometimes these antivirus agents are installed within the 
virtual server (guest machine) and at times engineers prefer to install antivirus agents 
on the host machine.  
According to a research conducted by Tolly Enterprises, the scan mechanism in an 
antivirus solution can lead to an implementation decision, as antivirus scans utilize 
network bandwidth and can cause performance delays in end user computing delays. 
Usually for virtual infrastructures with less than 300 virtual machines and 4 hosts, in-
band antivirus solution should be an appropriate choice for the engineers. In larger 
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virtual infrastructures environments where the datacentre comprises of more than 4 
hosts and 300 virtual machines, out-of-band antivirus solutions should be the first 
choice. (Tolly Enterprises, 2011) 
6.2.5 Change Control process for Virtual Machines 
Besides designing, deploying and administering virtual infrastructures, change 
control processes should be adopted by the IT management to address the visibility 
of any additions or changes to the existing virtual network infrastructure. With just a 
few mouse clicks from the virtual infrastructure’s management console, virtual 
machines can appear and disappear from the network very quickly.  
Over a period of time, the number of virtual machines can become difficult to 
manage, as the number can increase rapidly. Therefore change control processes can 
help administrators monitor and record any new introductions or changes to an 
existing virtual network infrastructure. This will eliminate the possibility of having 
unwanted virtual machines in the network and easily identify any rogue machines 
that were not approved by the change control process.     
6.3 Conclusion and Future Study 
This research investigated how virtualization can be used for secure deployment of 
virtual DMZs. Three virtual DMZ designs were tested to identify the appropriate 
virtual DMZ design for an organization, based on the security requirements of their 
existing network infrastructure. The results of this research can provide valuable 
information for systems and network engineers for implementing virtual DMZs in 
their network. All three virtual DMZ designs were almost equally secure. The most 
significant factor in deploying virtual DMZs depends upon the security solutions that 
are currently implemented in the existing network. The existing firewalls and 
antivirus solutions might not be virtualization aware. Therefore while designing any 
of the three virtual DMZ designs engineers have to consider what firewall and 
antivirus solutions they need to implement. The details of factors that can lead to 
deployment decisions are mentioned in Section 6.2.  
In this research, the following things could not be considered due to the limited scope 
of the project and could be further extended by: 
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 Comparing VMware ESXi's implementation and administration of virtual 
DMZs with other bare-metal virtualization solutions like Citrix’ XenServer, 
Microsoft Hyper-V; etc. 
 Evaluating the security issues introduced by other virtualization solutions to 
an existing network, as compared to VMware ESXi virtual solution. Compare 
performance vectors of other virtualization to VMware's ESXi 
 Conduct similar vulnerability assessment tests by placing the web server in a 
public cloud, i.e. in different datacentres where they provide VPS (virtual 
private servers) 
Although virtualization as a concept has been in existence since the 1970s, its 
implementation and user acceptance in modern datacentres still has a long way to go, 
especially with the growth of cloud computing.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Benchmark matrix for Vulnerability Assessment 
Parameters  Rspsweb01 Server  Configuration 
Setup Values (Expected Values) 
Values Detected by 
Vulnerability Assessment Tools 
Open ports 
 TCP 
 UDP 
 
 80 
 53 
 
OS Finger Print 
 IP address 
 Hostname 
 OS Type 
 
 192.168.7.115 
 Rspsweb01.rsps.net 
 Windows Server 2008 
 
MAC Address  00-0c-29-88-0e-48  
Services  HTTP - httpapihttpd 2.0 
(SSDp/Upnp) 
 DNS - Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001 
 
Route  203.168.1.254 
 192.168.8.253 
 192.168.7.254 
 192.168.7.115 
 
Firewall Detection  Host Placed Behind Firewall  
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Appendix B: Device type, role and configuration reference table. 
Hostname IP Address & Interface Role Device 
rsps_gw01 
External/Public Interface – 
203.168.1.254 
Internal Interface – 192.168.8.254 
Gateway router Cisco 806 
router 
rsps_extfw01 WAN interface – 192.168.8.253 
LAN Interface – 192.168.10.253 
DMZ interface – 192.168.7.253 
(external trust zone) 
A three tired firewall 
for filtering traffic and 
separating perimeter or 
DMZ network.   
pfSense – an 
open source 
FreeBSD based 
firewall 
distribution  
rsps_lanr01 Interface e0/1 – 192.168.10.254, 
external facing interface (firewall 
facing interface) 
Interface e0/0 – trunk port with sub 
interfaces 
Interface e0/0.1 – 192.168.1.254 
(VLAN 10 default gateway) 
Interface e0/0.2 (VLAN 20 default 
gateway) 
Interface e0/0.3 (VLAN 30 default 
gateway) 
Core LAN router with 
inter VLAN routing. 
Cisco 2611 
router 
rsps_coresw01 Interface G0/1 – trunk port for inter 
VLAN communication to the uplink 
Rest all ports are access ports  
VALN 10 – Management VLAN 
VLAN 20 – Servers VLAN 
VLAN 30 – Clients VLAN 
Core LAN switch  
 
Cisco WS-
C2950T-24 
switch 
rsps_intfw01 WAN interface – 192.168.7.253 
(external trust zone) 
LAN interface – 192.168.6.254 
(internal trust zone) 
Second firewall for the 
creation of separate 
trust zones within the 
DMZ    
pfSense – an 
open source 
FreeBSD based 
firewall 
distribution 
rspsdc01 192.168.2.100 Domain Controller - 
Active Directory, 
DHCP and LAN DNS 
Windows 
Server 2008 32 
bit 
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server  
rspsfil1 192.168.2.101 File Server  Windows 
Server 2008 32 
bit 
rspsvc01 192.168.1.4 Virtual infrastructure 
management server  
VMware 
vCentre Server 
4.0 on 
Windows 
Server 2003 32 
bit 
rspsweb01 192.168.7.115 Server for hosting web 
(http) and FTP sites. 
Hosted sites 
www.rspstest.com on 
port 80 and 
ftp.rspstest.com on 
port 21 
Windows 
Server 2008 32 
bit 
rspsmail01 192.168.7.110 Email Server  Exchange 
Server 2007 on 
Windows 
Server 2008 64 
bit  
rspsdmzdns01 192.168.7.105 Authoritative DNS 
server for the 
organisation and also 
DNS server for the 
DMZ servers  
Windows 
Server 2008 32 
bit 
rspsdb01 192.196.6.150 Database Server  Windows 
Server 2003 32 
bit 
rspsmonitor 192.168.1.20 Management machine 
to monitor and manage 
the entire network  
Windows 7 32 
bit 
rspssan01 192.168.1.133 Storage area network 
machine with drives 
configured on RAID 1. 
The machine 
advertises LUNs as 
data stores to the 
virtual machine hosts 
and also logical hard 
drives to the servers.     
Openfiler – an 
opensource 
distribution to 
create SAN or 
NAS on x86 
architecture 
machines. 
rspshost02 192.168.1.2 To host management 
and Server 
VMware ESXi 
3.5 on Dell 
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VLANvirtual 1920 1U rack 
server  
rspshost03 192.168.1.3 To host virtual 
machines in DMZ  
VMware ESXi 
3.5 on Dell 
2850 2U rack 
server 
rspsdc01 192.168.1.1 To host virtual 
machines in DMZ 
VMware ESXi 
3.5 on Dell 
2650 2U rack 
server 
rspsclinet01 192.168.3.1 Client Machine  Windows 7 32 
bit  
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